IRMP 2011 – 12 Action Plan

Recommendation 2

Community Safety Review

November 2011

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Contents

1.   Executive Summary

1.1   As a result of a comprehensive review of the Community Safety Department, its prevention activities and resource deployment within Hereford & Worcester Fire and Rescue Service (HWFRS), this report proposes forty eight specific recommendations which have been designed to fundamentally change the way in which the Service delivers its community safety activities in the future.

1.2   Fundamentally the Service will move to an evidence led, risk targeted approach to community safety making the best use of the resources it has available.

1.3   The changes proposed in this report are essential if the Service is to ensure that it delivers high quality prevention activities. In broad terms it challenges existing practices with regard to community risk priorities, departmental structure, resources and methods of delivery.

1.4   The review is designed to re-focus the activities of both the Community Safety Department, based at Service Headquarters in Worcester, as well as the activities of operational personnel based on the three Districts.

1.5   The review has been broken down into six key areas in order to ensure that a systematic approach has been taken in all areas. The six sections are detailed below:

>   1. Community Safety Strategy
>   2. Community Safety Departmental Structure
>   3. Community Safety Manager's Role
>   4. Community Safety Methods of Delivery
>   5. Conclusions
>   6. Recommendations

1.6   Each section has been subject to analysis of the current arrangements in place, comparison with national guidance and identification of possible areas for improvement.

1.7   The following paragraphs provide a summary of findings for each of the six sections and also the recommendations put forward for consideration by the Senior Management Board (SMB).

Community Safety Strategy

1.8   The review has identified that whilst the Service does have a Community Safety Strategy in the form of the "How To" guide, this document does not appear to be based on sound evidence or detailed demographic data, rather it appears to reflect a blend of local and national perceived priorities. The document is not widely understood by those staff responsible for its delivery and as a result many of the intervention activities currently taking place do not

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clearly align with the document. Also, the Service does not appear to have in place a clear framework for delivery of the strategy with clear lines of responsibility and ownership for related key performance indicators.

1.9 With this in mind and following the detailed research, which can be referenced in Part 3 of this report, the review has identified that the Service's priorities in terms of community risk, both now and in the future, can be summarised under four main headings:

- Accidental Dwelling Fires
- Road Safety
- Arson Reduction
- Elderly and Vulnerable People

1.10 In response to the findings of the review, the report recommends that the Service should develop a revised overarching Community Safety Strategy and supporting delivery framework, based around the four areas detailed above. The delivery framework should clearly identify specific post holders who will be required to take responsibility for key Community Safety performance indicators. Whilst it is proposed that the four key areas above should become the primary focus for Community Safety work in future, the Service will obviously maintain the flexibility to react to other emerging risks as they present themselves.

1.11 The new Strategy should clearly identify the role of the Community Safety Department as well as the role of operational crews based at District level as their contribution is vital to the overall success of effective community engagement.

**Community Safety Department Structure**

1.12 The current structure of the Community Safety Department has evolved over the years as a direct result of past priorities which have since become either core business or are no longer relevant. Crucially, the departmental structure does not reflect the evidence based priorities identified above, which have been determined by sound current and predictive demographic data.

1.13 In order to address this situation and ensure that there is effective targeting of the new priority areas, as well as ensuring maximum efficiency from limited resources, the department now needs to be restructured to reflect the four new strategic priority areas identified by this review.

1.14 It is recommended that in future the department should establish four clear leads for each of the priorities identified above and that all individuals within the department must have clear lines of responsibility; they must also take ownership of key performance indicators, data sets, intervention strategies and evaluation processes.

1.15   Without such an approach the Service cannot realistically realise the maximum benefits of its investment in staff and infrastructure, which are vital to the delivery of high quality services to the general public and business communities.   The proposed Community Safety Department structure, including the four departmental lead roles which have been highlighted is detailed in Fig 1 below.

Fig 1 Proposed Community Safety Department Structure.

1.16   The above structure can easily be achieved by utilising many of the existing skills and personnel currently employed within the CS Department; however, as detailed above, the proposal does include a reduction in overall staffing numbers.

Community Safety Manager's Role

1.17   For the past three years the role of the Community Safety Manager has been held by a non-uniformed employee with specialist skills in Partnership liaison.

1.18   This arrangement is considered to have been effective and has clearly increased the Organisation's effectiveness in engaging with strategic community safety partnerships. However, the need for a stronger links between the Community Safety Department, operational crews and fire

investigation, is now considered to be an important priority as one area clearly informs the other.

1.19 With this in mind the review has identified that the Community Safety Department has, for the last twelve months, back-filled the existing vacant Community Safety Manager's post with a uniformed Station Commander B, which has proven to be extremely effective in developing crucial inter-departmental links and communication. Vitally the link between the Community Safety Department and the operational side of Service business has been started to improve, whilst performance within strategic community safety partnerships has been maintained. As a result of this situation the report recommends that the Community Safety Department structure be adjusted to include a uniformed Station Commander B reporting directly to the Group Commander Technical Fire Safety on a permanent basis.

Community Safety Methods of Delivery

1.20 The review has identified that the Community Safety Department is currently engaged in a wide range of community safety activities designed to deliver key safety messages to the public and business community, including:

- Home Fire Safety Checks
- Road Safety activities
- Schools education programmes
- Water Safety activities
- Safeguarding children and young people
- Arson Reduction activities
- Volunteering
- Young Firefighters Association
- Community Safety Advisors

Home Fire Safety Checks

1.21 Historically, Home Fire Safety Checks have not been targeted as effectively as they could be, only utilising a small amount of the data available to inform the approach. As a result of this review, the Service has already begun to address this situation by procuring Pinpoint software, a web-based solution dedicated to increasing the impact of HFSCs, as well as securing access to key databases held by partner organisations which should further inform an evidence led approach to HFSC delivery.

Road Safety

1.22 Whilst Road Safety is an area in which the Service has evolved considerably over the years, and is currently delivering a number of high profile activities, there is no dedicated resource within the CS department. As a result of this report it is recommended that the Service establish a dedicated individual with

clear responsibility for the development of road safety strategy and organisational performance in this area of work.

Schools Education

1.23   The Service has historically provided fire safety education to schools within the two counties for over ten years; in particular targeting has focused on Key Stage 2 pupils. However there is little evidence to justify this activity and to quantify success in terms of reducing risk within the two counties. As a result of this situation the Service is currently trialling a reduction in the Schools Education Programme focusing its efforts on those schools which serve communities which incorporate only the highest risk households. This will also have a positive impact on the activities of front line resources, freeing up valuable time which can be better spent delivering HFSCs and other intervention strategies to known "at risk" groups and individuals.

Water Safety

1.24   The review has identified that at present there is no clear plan or structure for the delivery of water safety messages and no rationale as to where in the two Counties water safety intervention should be targeted or which groups and individuals would most benefit from it.

1.25   The review has not identified water safety as a key priority for the Service and therefore it is recommended that in future any activity in this area should only be considered if there is clear evidence to suggest that Service intervention activities are necessary.

Safeguarding Children and Young People

1.26   The review has identified that Safeguarding is a statutory obligation for the Service which is governed by several pieces of legislation.   Despite the presence of a policy and training having been delivered to staff, there is evidence to suggest that some areas of the policy are not being fully implemented or adhered to.   As a result of these findings the review has recommended that Safeguarding children and adults should continue to be managed and maintained centrally as a specific reference within the Community Safety Department and that any areas of non-compliance are addressed as a priority.

Arson Reduction Activities

1.27   The review has identified that there is no clear policy within the Service in relation to arson reduction, although it is mentioned within the IRMP 2009-12 and the "How To" guide. There is also a dedicated Arson Reduction Manager post within the Community Safety Department's structure.

1.28   The review has also identified that the vast majority of Secondary fires are caused by arson and that this in turn has an extremely negative impact on

local communities and the local infrastructure and contributes to people's negative perception of high crime rates and threatened personal security. Also Arson attacks on key premises within the community such as schools, community buildings and local businesses can be devastating in terms of disruption to people's lives and standards of living, as well as the hidden costs to the local community and prosperity of the area. Finally Central Government continue to predict a rise in arson crime over the coming years as the economic outlook for the Country continues to be bleak. For this reason it is recommended that arson reduction should not only be maintained but it should in fact become one of the four primary activities of the Community Safety Department going forward.

Volunteering

1.29   The Service's Volunteering Scheme currently includes 32 volunteers, working in all three District areas. Fire Service volunteers provide a valuable support function to a wide variety of front line services and in particular they are available to assist with the delivery of community fire safety intervention activities and are considered to be an important resource of the Community Safety Department. However, the review has identified that they are not currently being utilised to maximum effect with regard to supporting the four key priorities identified on Page 3.

1.30   The review has also identified that in order to achieve this essential re-focus, coordination of their activities would be better placed under the control of the local Community Safety Advisors who work within the Districts.

Young Firefighters Association

1.31   For many years the Service has hosted its own Young Firefighters Association with well established units based at both Droitwich and Redditch. The Young Firefighters Association is viewed by the Service, the community and political leaders as an excellent method of engaging, supporting and mentoring young people from a wide variety of different backgrounds to become responsible, self-disciplined young adults and therefore must remain an essential activity for the organisation going forward.

1.32   The review has identified that there is currently no clear strategy in relation to the YFA. Individual branches are run in different ways, in the absence of standard protocols, and each relies heavily on goodwill and the contribution of many volunteer staff.

1.33   The report therefore recommends that there is a complete review of the YFA, to include a clear co-ordination role for the Community Safety Department, as well as development of a clear strategy for the YFA going forward and this should be supported by organisational policy where appropriate.

Community Safety Advisors

1.34   The Service currently employs four Community Safety Advisors who are located within each of the three Districts. The CSAs are considered to be the primary means of outreach to the local community for the FRS.

1.35   This review has recognised their invaluable contribution to the Community Safety Department and delivery of the community safety agenda; it therefore supports their role in the Service both now and in the future and this has been reflected in the proposed new Community Safety Department structure detailed in on Page 4.

Partnership Engagement

1.36   The Service has, for many years, positively engaged in Partnership working, at all levels, with great success. However little or no consideration has been given to evaluation of the local partnerships, which have been developed by both the Community Safety Department and Districts. With this in mind it is recommended that a review and evaluation of all Partnerships needs to be conducted in order to ensure that they meet the strategic needs of the Service and co-ordination of local partnership activity needs to be the responsibility of the Community Safety Department, ensuring that local representatives are actively working towards the Community Safety strategy.

Community Safety Budget/Costs

1.37   A full review of the Community Safety Budget has been undertaken as part of this review and the outcome has been that the Community Safety Department should be able to return a saving of £189,000 year on year for the Service.

1.38   The proposed changes to the budget were implemented on the 1st of April 2011 and the department now benefits from strict management and control of spending. Lead references are no longer authorised to spend and work on the basis of a 'zero budget'. All spending is strictly authorised by the Head of Department.

1.39   In addition the estimated savings from the proposed new Community Safety Department structure should realise a further saving of approximately £91,000 year on year.

Summary of Progress

1.40   In the best interests of the Service a number of changes have already been made in support of the recommendations detailed within this report, as not to do so would have hindered obvious areas of improvement to the detriment of the organisation and the communities it serves. All of the recommendations

already implemented have been introduced with the full backing and authorisation of the SMB and they include the following:

- Restructure and reduction in Community Safety Department Revenue Budget.
- Refocus of schools education programme to focus on high risk groups only
- Partial re-structure of the Community Safety Department to include the introduction of HFSC Technicians, Senior Administrator and reduction of the Juvenile Firesetter post
- Procurement of Pinpoint software to support the evidence led approach to HFSC
- Entry into data sharing agreements with key partner agencies including the NHS and Age UK.
- The nomination of lead individuals within the Community Safety Department to take responsibility for key performance indicators.
- Change of focus for Community Safety Department intervention activities to include the four new areas of priority.
- Commencement of the development of intervention evaluation tools for all campaigns and activities
- The introduction of seasonal intervention campaigns based on internal and external indicative data.
- Enhanced internal data capture and performance monitoring procedures to inform reactive and long term departmental business.

1.41 A final outcome of the review has been the identification for an ongoing annual review of departmental business and strategy in order to ensure that the Service continues to keep track on the changing community risk profile and to ensure that the best possible service is provided to the public at all times.

The following table gives a summary of the recommendations identified by this report, including whether or not each recommendation has already been implemented in full, partially implemented or has yet to be implemented:

Summary of Recommendations	Anticipated Completion	Priority
The structure of the Community Safety Department needs to be changed to reflect the findings of this report	Apr-12	High
The Community Safety strategy should be reviewed and amended to reflect the findings of this review for all areas of work	Jun-12	Medium
Develop an evaluation tool to determine the successes of work undertaken in relation to reducing risk in the community	Apr-12	Medium
Identify those most at risk from fire and target them as a priority	Apr-12	High
The Community Safety Department needs to develop broader engagement with partner agencies and community groups to exchange information and target the most vulnerable	Jun-12	Medium
The HFSC Technicians and/or the Volunteer Programme could be extended to provide a cost effective solution to Community Safety in RDS locations	Jun-12	Low
A set procedure should exist to establish the causes of all fire related deaths and serious injuries, working closely with Fire Investigators	May-12	High
Determine the success of current Road Safety initiatives and incorporate into strategy as appropriate	Apr-12	Medium

Summary of Recommendations	Anticipated Completion	Priority
The Schools Education Programme should be part of a targeted strategy that reflects the findings of this report	Complete	Medium
Safeguarding is a statutory responsibility and should be managed and maintained centrally as a reference of the Community Safety Department	Apr-12	High
Develop a robust system for monitoring operational activity to allow proactive and reactive initiatives to be developed	Complete	High
Determine volunteer involvement within the Service in supporting the reduction of risk including local access to volunteers	Jun-12	Medium
Complete a review of the YFA to include recommendations to move forward in line with the Service's strategic objectives	Jun-12	High
Develop an events strategy in line with the outcomes of this review	Apr-12	Medium
Administration for the CS and TFS department needs to be reviewed in its entirety	Complete	High
Establish a permanent Flexi-Duty Station Commander B post as the head of the Community Safety Department	Apr-12	High

The table shows that a number of recommendations of this report have already been implemented or started as they were deemed to be in the interest of the Service. These recommendations have been agreed by SMB outside of this report.

2.   Introduction

2.1   Recommendation Two of the Service's IRMP Action Plan for 2010/11 requires the organisation to conduct a fundamental review of its Community Safety activities and resource allocation. In particular the IRMP Action Plan states:

"We will review the allocation of our Community Safety resources to ensure best fit of activities to risk.   This will maximise our ability to reduce risk in our communities"

2.2   The purpose of this review is to discharge the requirements of the IRMP Action Plan 2010/11, as detailed above, by conducting an analysis of relevant data and information, sourced both locally and nationally in order to determine the impact and outcomes of the activities currently being carried out by the Community Safety Department and how best to allocate resources in the future, based on tangible evidence.

2.3   In order to provide clear focus for the review, terms of reference were provided by the Area Commander Community Risk. The main areas covered by the review include:

- A review of National Guidance

- A summary of the existing and predicted demographical information within the two Counties

- A summary of the Service's at risk groups

- A profile of the Service's operational activity

2.4   The following roles were allocated to ensure clear lines of responsibility and communication whilst the review was undertaken:

- SMB Sponsor: DCFO Lawrence
- Review Co-ordinator: AC Hodges
- Report Author: SC Wills
- Initial Research: SC Butlin

2.5   The review has resulted in forty eight recommendations being identified for consideration by Senior Management Board, which are designed to improve the Community Safety function of the Service and ensure it is suitably prepared to meet the demands of an ever changing community risk profile.

3.   Background

3.1   Hereford & Worcester Fire and Rescue Service is committed to improving safety within the communities of Herefordshire and Worcestershire through effective community safety initiatives, particularly targeting those individuals and groups who are deemed to be most at risk .

3.2   The Service hosts its own Community Safety Department, based at Service Headquarters in Worcester, and is currently engaged in a wide range of community safety activities across both counties. The organisation delivers community safety activities in four main ways:

1.   Through dedicated employed staff such as community safety advisors, youth workers or arson reduction specialists
2.   Through station based staff delivering community safety from local Fire Stations.
3.   Through the utilisation of the third sector or volunteers to deliver targeted community safety in specified areas
4.   Through engagement with partner agencies to deliver the community safety agenda

3.3   Community Safety activities delivered by H&WRS have historically been influenced primarily by the CLG National Framework Document, Community Safety Staff intuition and the requirements of senior management. There is limited evidence to indicate that it has been led by data trend analysis or quality partnership intelligence.

3.4   The purpose of this report is to review relevant data and information, sourced both locally and nationally, in order to determine the impact and effectiveness of the work currently carried out by the department and how best to allocate resources in the future, in recognition of an ever changing risk profile.

3.5   From the analysis undertaken in this review recommendations have then been made in order to ensure the Service conducts its Community Safety activities to maximum effect, both now and in the future, to meet the needs of those most at risk in the communities we serve.

4.   Methodology

4.1   The review was based around clear lines of enquiry as detailed within the scoping document of IRMP Action Plan 11/12. The following analysis was conducted:

   i.   A Review of National Guidance.

   ii.   A Review of the Service's Community Safety activities and current resource deployment

   iii.   Summary of existing and predicted demographical information.

   iv.   Summary of known "at risk" groups and order of priority ranking.

   v.   Profile of operational activity with identification of existing and predicted areas requiring priority intervention.

4.2   Information for all lines of enquiry were obtained from relevant sources and included:

   - Key government publications
   - Notable practices within the CFOA remit
   - Locally driven reviews conducted within the Performance & Information department
   - Lead data publications including partner agencies.

4.3   All of the information was analysed to determine an outlook for both now and the future for reducing risk in the community.

Part 2

Findings of the Review

The following sections reflect the six key areas within the IRMP Review. Each area is broken down to include the findings of the review and any recommendations for improvement to be considered by SMB.

1.   Community Safety Strategy

1.1   The review has identified that whilst the Service does have a Community Safety Strategy in the form of the "How To" Guide, this document does not appear to be based on sound evidence or detailed demographic data, rather it appears to reflect a blend of local and national perceived priorities. Also the Service does not appear to have in place a clear framework for delivery of the strategy with clear lines of responsibility and ownership for related key performance indicators.

1.2   As a result of this situation, H&WFRS has historically had a tendency to be more reactive than pro-active in its approach to the delivery of community safety activities. It has also tended to take a "broad brush" approach to many of its intervention activities including Schools education, arson reduction, the delivery of Home Fire Safety Checks and Road Safety, delivering intervention education to all rather than focusing on high risk groups and individuals. Whilst this might be considered to be commendable in many respects it could also be considered to be over ambitious, limited in its effectiveness and possibly an ineffective use of valuable resources as other risk reduction work has not been delivered at the same time.

1.3   It is evident that the organisation has limited resources which it must now utilise to maximum effect and that this situation is unlikely to improve, or may even reduce further, given the current financial climate and challenges faced by the Service. With this in mind it has been recognised that the Service must now move away from the "broad brush" approach to one which is more intelligence led and consistently prioritised on a risk assessed basis. It must also accept that not all traditional recipients of community safety education will continue to do so in the future.

1.4   The quality of data now available from central government, partner agencies and from within the Service itself is of sufficient quality to help move the Community Safety Department to adopt a more intelligence led approach in future. In recognition of this, the Service has already progressed some of the findings of this review, as not to do so would have delayed obvious areas of development unnecessarily. This approach has enabled the Service to make huge steps forward in areas such as its recent procurement of Pinpoint risk profiling software, renewed data sharing agreements with key partner agencies and the use of national guidance documents such as the National Older Person's Strategy.

1.5   It is also evident that the department needs to plan its activities more effectively in the future, taking into account both historical and predictive data. There is no evidence to suggest that there is a robust planning procedure for each year's prevention activities and also no process for evaluation of community safety work. In addition to this, there is currently no method for identifying the primary risk to the community at any point within the year, nor a method to monitor the changing risk profile. In direct response to this situation and as a direct result of this review the Community Safety Manager has recently introduced new internal processes for capturing and monitoring

vital internal data more efficiently including road traffic collision data, fire related injury data, vulnerable people intervention, domestic dwelling fires as well as secondary fires and deliberate fire data. These data sets are now being closely monitored on a daily basis and the information is being utilised to inform immediate reactive and longer term prevention strategies. In addition, data sharing protocols have recently been signed with the NHS and Age UK as these two organisations hold specific data on the primary "at risk" groups the department is hoping to target.

1.6   The Department needs to develop clear aims and objectives for each area of work which detail the rationale, methods of delivery and resource allocation as well as pre planned timetabled events which are subject to comprehensive evaluation in order to ensure continued improvement over time. This will result in a clearer, evidence led approach to community safety; it will also help to improve staff morale and confidence as the team have clearer direction and a common vision going forward.

1.7   With this in mind and following the detailed research, which can be referenced in Part 3 of this report, the review has identified that the Service's priorities in terms of community risk, both now and in the future, can be summarised under four main headings:

- Accidental Dwelling Fires
- Road Safety
- Arson Reduction
- Elderly and Vulnerable People

1.8   In response to the findings of the review the report recommends that the Service develops a revised overarching Community Safety Strategy and supporting delivery framework based around the four areas detailed above. The delivery framework should clearly identify specific post holders to take responsibility for key performance indicators. Whilst it is proposed that the four key areas above should become the primary focus for Community Safety work in future the Service will obviously maintain the flexibility to react to other emerging risks as they present themselves.

Summary of Recommendations for Community Safety Strategy

Detailed below is a list of all recommendations identified for consideration by SMB:

- The Community Safety strategy should be reviewed and amended to reflect the findings of this review and include a clear framework for delivery.

- An evaluation tool needs to be developed to assess the effectiveness of all Community Safety activities.

- The Community Safety Department should adopt the four key strategic priorities identified within this report as its primary areas of intervention activity including:

    - Accidental Dwelling Fires
    - Road Safety
    - Arson Reduction
    - Elderly and Vulnerable People

- The Service should focus all intervention activities on those groups and individuals within the community identified as "at risk" rather than the more traditional broad brush approach currently in place.

- The Community Safety Department should consider the development of a robust method of prevention activity planning, including seasonal and reactive elements, which takes account of historical data and incident profiling as well as utilising the very latest databases available both commercially or via key partner agencies.

2. Community Safety Department Structure

2.1 The review has identified that the current structure of the Community Safety Department has evolved to reflect past priorities, out of date targets and previous projects which have now either been abandoned or have become core business, as shown in Fig 2 below and Appendix Four.

Fig 2 Existing Structure of Community Safety Department

2.2 It can clearly be seen from Fig 2 above that the departmental structure does not reflect the new evidence based priorities identified which have been based on sound existing and predictive demographic data.

2.3 In order to address this situation and ensure that there is effective targeting of the new priority areas, as well as ensuring maximum efficiency from limited resources, the department now needs to be restructured to reflect the four new strategic priority areas identified by this review including:

- Accidental Dwelling Fires
- Road Safety
- Arson Reduction
- Elderly and Vulnerable People

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2.4 It is recommended that in future there should be four clear leads for each of the priorities and all individuals within the department must have clear lines of responsibility; they must also take ownership of key performance indicators, data sets, intervention strategies and evaluation processes. The proposed re-structure includes the establishment of a dedicated Senior Administrator, to take responsibility for the increased requirement for data management, the permanent establishment of the two temporary Home Fire Safety Technician posts, due to their considerable success in generating and delivering HFSCs and the permanent disestablishment of one Community Safety Advisor, as three are considered to be adequate. It also proposes the disestablishment of the Juvenile Fire Setter and Volunteer Coordinator posts as these two disciplines have now become well established and can be considered to be core business.

Without such an approach the Service cannot realistically realise the maximum benefits of its investment in staff and infrastructure which are vital to the delivery of quality services to the general public and business communities.

2.5 The proposed Community Safety Department structure is detailed in Fig 1 below:

Fig 1 Proposed Community Safety Department Structure

2.6   The proposed structure (Fig 1) is based around the four priority areas identified by the analysis in this report. These areas are further explained in the Conclusions section of the report (Page 43).

2.7   This structure enables each of these areas and their associated Performance Indicators to be allocated to an individual for monitoring and improvement with the resources they have allocated to them.

2.8   Currently, managers in the department do not have access to the resources or individuals that could have a direct impact on their area of work. This is seen within the current structure (Appendix Four) where the Watch Commander responsible for monitoring accidental dwelling fires, does not control the work of Community Safety Advisors. Equally the education and youth expertise in the department are not currently linked to the YFA or Juvenile Fire Setter schemes.

2.9   Signposting for Herefordshire, which involves key partner organisations referring the services of other agencies to those in greatest need, has now been returned to Herefordshire Primary Care Trust, where previously it had been part of the department's structure in the form of a secondment. Worcestershire Signposting is seen as a small part of addressing the issue of Elderly and Vulnerable People, which is identified by this report as priority. There the proposed structure is for the creation of a Vulnerable Persons Officer post which will manage the Signposting service whilst addressing the wider issues associated with this area. To allow for this to be effective, administrative support will be provided to the Vulnerable Persons Officer for Signposting referrals. This will be in the form of a reference for an administrator, as a proportion of their work and not an entire post.

2.10   The Juvenile Fire Setter Programme, which involves uniformed staff working closely with young people who have displayed a history of arson activity, is now considered to be normal business within the department. This comes under the responsibility of the Watch Commander responsible for Arson Reduction. Therefore, there is no requirement for the role of Juvenile Fire Setter Co-Ordinator and this does not feature in the proposed structure (Appendix Five).

2.11   The review of the Administration Team for the department has been conducted during the writing of this report as this proved to be in the best interests of the Service. The recommendations of this review, to provide a dedicated Senior Administrator for Community Safety with one full time and one part time Administrator, are reflected in the proposed structure (Appendix Five).

2.12   The introduction of HFSC Technicians to the department has taken place on a trial basis over the last twelve months and has proved to be a great success and very beneficial to the Service as indicated by the analysis within this report. Therefore, the proposed structure reflects this with two permanent Technician Posts responsible to the Senior Administrator for Community

Safety. This line of reporting is proposed as the most efficient due the Senior Administrator post being responsible for the CFRMIS database and also Pinpoint, which both govern the allocation of Home Fire Safety Checks. This governance of Home Fire Safety Checks will be even greater should the recommendations of this report be accepted, leading to improved targeting and prioritisation of Home Fire Safety Checks as referrals are received, through the use of Pinpoint.

2.13 The Volunteering Programme, which involves members of the public assisting with the delivery of key Fire Service activities, including Community Safety prevention work, has been very successful and is now established in the daily operations of the department and Districts. Volunteers are currently centrally managed and the rationale for this was to embed their management and closely supervise their effectiveness. This central management has now become restrictive due to managers within Districts not being able to access the Volunteer Programme locally. Therefore, the proposed structure (Appendix Five) reflects this by Districts being able to access volunteers for their area through their local Community Safety Advisor. The majority of demand for Volunteers is to assist with Community Safety events, which are predominantly organised by Community Safety Advisors. This change to the structure therefore acknowledges this.

Summary of Recommendations for the Community Safety Department Structure

Detailed below is a list of all recommendations identified for consideration by SMB:

- The Community Safety Departmental structure should be reviewed and amended to reflect the findings of this review as detailed in Fig 1 above.

3. Community Safety Department Manager's Role

3.1 For the past three years the role of the Community Safety Manager has been held by a non-uniformed employee with specialist skills in Partnership liaison. Prior to this, the Community Safety Manager had been a uniformed officer of Group Commander level. The decision to make the Community Safety Manager's post non-uniformed was made in response to the requirements of central Government, as effective partnership liaison had been declared a top priority for Local Authorities and local Public Services.

3.2 Whilst this arrangement has clearly improved the organisation's effectiveness in engaging with strategic community safety partnerships there is now a requirement for a stronger links between the Community Safety Department and the operational side of Service Delivery, as one area clearly informs the other.

3.3 In particular the lack of a fundamental link between the Community Safety Department and the Fire Investigation function, which currently sits within the Technical Fire Safety Department, has resulted in a lack of consistent intelligence which is crucial in developing and shaping both Community Safety strategy as well as informing reactive activities. Fire Investigation is an analytical process which establishes both the cause of fire as well as identifying the primary influential elements including social, physical and psychological contributory factors. Identification of the contributory factors forms the very basis of community safety intervention work and is therefore seen as an essential inject into Community Safety business. For these reasons it would make sound business sense to reinstate a direct link between Community Safety and Fire Investigation and this could be achieved via the Community Safety Manager's role.

3.4 The review has identified that the Community Safety Manager's role has been vacant for the last twelve months and that this post has been back-filled with a uniformed Station Commander B, which has proven to be extremely effective in restoring crucial inter departmental links and communication. Vitally the link between the Community Safety Department and the operational side of Service business has been improved, whilst performance within strategic community safety partnerships has been maintained. As a result of this situation the report recommends that the Community Safety Department structure be adjusted to include a uniformed Station Commander B, preferably Fire Investigation trained, reporting directly to the Group Commander Technical Fire Safety on a permanent basis. This proposal could be achieved at no additional cost to the organisation as the Training and Development Department has declared a reduction to its managerial establishment levels by one Station Commander B and therefore a straightforward movement of posts could easily take place.

3.5 This proposed change to departmental structure would also address the issue of the Community Safety Manager reporting directly to the Area Commander Community Risk, which is currently the case. Reporting to the Group

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Commander role will allow a greater collaboration between Technical Fire Safety and Community Safety, whilst also keeping the Area Commander spans of control at an appropriate level.

Summary of Recommendations for the Role of Community Safety Department Manager

Detailed below is a list of all recommendations identified for consideration by SMB:

- The Service should consider establishing a permanent Flexi-Duty Station Commander B post as the head of the Community Safety Department providing a link to the operational side of Service Delivery

- Where possible this post should hold the specialism of FI to co-ordinate the findings of investigations to then inform future practice.

- Line management of this role will be carried out by the Group Commander B role which is currently aligned to Technical Fire Safety only.

4.   Community Safety Methods of Delivery

4.1   The following section examines the existing key methods of delivery of community safety intervention.

Home Fire Safety Checks

4.2   In recent years the Home Fire Safety Check (HFSC) has become a core activity of the Service, providing smoke detectors and advice to residents in domestic properties. There has been a very broad strategy for delivering HFSC, which has been based on quantity and not quality.

4.3   The level of HFSC activity over the last 3 years has varied across the Service. The numbers of HFSCs carried out currently are the highest they have ever been, despite retained staff in outlying areas no longer undertaking Community Safety duties.

4.4   Efforts have been made to target HFSCs towards household demographic types that are having the most fires. However, the Service does not target those households deemed to be most at risk of accidental dwelling fires as a priority.

4.5   From April 2009 to March 2011, the Service has carried out 5922 HFSCs with 1475 (25%) delivered in output areas and 2336 completed as part of initiatives within Districts. These district based activities are informed by the evidence documents produced by the Service's Performance and Information

Department. These documents use the Mosaic demographic tool to identify the main demographics deemed to be at risk from accidental dwelling fires. These are:

- Young people renting flats in high density social housing (Group N)
- Families in low-rise social housing with high levels of benefit need (Group O)
- Elderly people reliant on state support (Group M)

4.6 There has, to date, been very limited use of partner agencies to generate HFSCs other than via the Signposting initiative.

4.7 As a result of this situation, and as a direct result of this review, the Service has procured the Pinpoint software. Pinpoint is a web-based solution dedicated to increasing the impact of HFSCs. The Pinpoint software provides intelligent predictions on the amount of household fires likely to occur in any given area during a chosen period. These predictions are all informed by a number of data sets such as incidents, lifestyle data, HFSC and NLPG that are automatically linked as they are uploaded and entered into the web based system on a daily basis.

4.8 With this information the Service is now able to respond to, and target, high risk areas and "at risk" groups avoiding knee jerk reactions to requests from the general public who may not be considered to be at risk of fire. It can also help the organisation to increase the number of high risk household interventions and target future HFSC activity dependant on the level of impact the checks have had. By identifying the level of risk accurately, this will allow the Service to tailor its prevention work appropriately. In some cases a lower level of prevention work may be suitable for a lower level of risk. Pinpoint also provides the capability to instantly measure changes in risk as more and more HFSCs are completed.

4.9 Pinpoint is currently the only software product on the market capable of providing this level of dedicated functionality.

4.10 Signposting is a joint arrangement between key organisations providing intervention activities within high risk households. Each of the partner organisations has the ability to signpost an individual or household to the services of another organisation if they feel that the appropriate criteria have been met. The Community Safety Department receives high volumes of HFSC referrals via this arrangement every week and therefore there is a requirement for the Community Safety Department to employ one individual to coordinate this valuable service from a Fire and Rescue perspective.

4.11 The Signposting service has proven itself extremely effective in the identification of those high risk vulnerable individuals within our communities through partner agencies and therefore it is recommended that this facility should be maintained. It has also been identified that this activity could be further enhanced by exploring the possibility of enhanced data sharing protocols with key partners such as Age UK and the NHS in order to facilitate even better targeting of those most vulnerable from fire.

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4.12 The review has identified that RDS staff ceased the delivery of HFSCs some twelve months ago due to operational training pressures. In response to this change the Community Safety department established two technician posts on a trial basis that are responsible for the completion of HFSCs in the RDS station grounds. These two Technician posts have been so successful that they now account for, on average, one third of all HFSCs completed by the Service as a whole. The Technician posts were established as a trial and remain on extended trial within the Department.

4.13 Whilst the Signposting arrangement manages agency referrals for HFSCs there is currently no clear lead person in the Department responsible for the overall management of HFSCs.

4.14 As a result of the extensive research carried out as part of this review it has been noted that other Fire and Rescue Services nationally, such as Cleveland and Cambridge have attributed a fall in accidental dwelling fires by targeting at risk groups using the information provided by Mosaic.

4.15 Further to this, Dorset FRS have shown improvements in accidental dwelling fires and costs by using Pinpoint to predict those most at risk of accidental dwelling fires using incident data as well as demographics. Dorset also uses a 'traffic light' system to prioritise referrals for HFSCs which can include lesser or greater intervention based on the risk identified. An example would be that a household which was determined to be low risk may only be given literature and advice of where to buy smoke alarms. A high risk premises would receive a visit and include the fitting of free alarms. This profiling is reinforced by a risk assessment carried out when entering and leaving the property to confirm whether the risk profiling is accurate.

4.16 Some Fire and Rescue Services such as Staffordshire have established a large team of HFSC Technicians to increase output and productivity in comparison to operational crews delivering HFSCs.

4.17 Understanding the causes for the most serious accidental dwelling fires would help inform a targeted strategy for HFSC. This could be done via the identification of patterns or trends which can then be included in the advice given within the HFSC. Currently, there is no clear link between the Fire Investigations carried out by the Service's specialist officers (Fire Investigation Officers) and the Community Safety Department. Vital information could be gained on the causes of the most serious fires, including deaths and serious injuries, were such a link to be established. Currently the reference of 'Lead Fire Investigator' resides within the Technical Fire Safety Department. There is no set procedure for communicating the findings of an investigation or establishing trends.

4.18 It is clear from the review that until recently the approach currently being taken has only partially been evidence led and therefore limited in its effectiveness. Review of national guidance and best practice has identified that there are some Services who have effectively developed the use of software and data sets to drive their HFSC strategy with positive results,

therefore the Service should ensure that the there is a clear lead for HFSCs established within the Community Safety Department and that all future activity is fully evidence led based on Pinpoint data and data provided by key partner agencies.

Road Safety

4.19   Whilst road safety is included in the "How To" Guide and an additional road safety strategy from 2007 also exists, there is little evidence within the department's activities to suggest that the Service is fully delivering on its objectives set within either of these documents or that Road Safety is a primary activity for the department in line with the research carried out in Part 3 of this report.

4.20   In addition, there is no dedicated resource to Road Safety within the department, no one formally owns the Road Safety performance indicators and therefore commitment is clearly limited and delivery can be described as ad-hoc.

4.21   Despite this situation a new agreement with the Safer Roads Partnership has recently been signed which enables the Service to work closely with the Police and other partners to reduce the risk on the roads of Hereford and Worcester, however, despite this arrangement there is limited coordination between the efforts of the Service and the partnership overall.

4.22   One positive element of work is the 'Dying to Drive' initiative in Herefordshire based at Peterchurch Fire Station which targets year 10 school children (14 & 15 year olds). This is an annual event; however no evaluation has taken place for this event until this year. The event is difficult to quantify in terms of success as the age range will not be driving for at least two years, however, the limited evaluation of this year shows that the initiative is well received by the schools and its format would be appropriate if delivered to an older age range.

4.23   The department has also supported the Worcestershire Road Safety Education Partnership including the Police, Safer Roads, Worcestershire County Council Youth Team, IAM & Roadcraft UK. The partnership is led by WCC and although all partners are keen to continue, the success of this partnership has not been evaluated.

4.24   The department has also recently created a fifty minute education programme in conjunction with Safer Roads with a two week trial being conducted at Worcestershire Sixth Form College in February 2011. It also delivers annual Biker Skills days in Redditch & Worcester although no such event is held in Herefordshire.

4.25   Nationally and locally the evidence shows a trend of 17-25 year olds being injured or killed on the roads and therefore the Service needs to develop a robust strategy to address this situation in partnership with other key organisations.

4.26   The research in Part 3 of this report also indicates that whilst there are a greater number of road traffic accidents occurring in Worcestershire, particularly within the Redditch and Worcester areas, the injuries received by casualties tends to be less serious than those victims of road traffic accidents in Herefordshire.

4.27   The review has concluded that although work is being carried out within the department to reduce risk in relation to roads, the evidence suggests that the success of this work is difficult to quantify and risk groups are not always targeted. A clear contributory factor is the fact that there is no one within the Community Safety Department dedicated to this area of work and no one currently owns the related key performance indicators.

4.28   As a direct result of this review the Community Safety Manager has recently nominated an individual within the Community Safety Department to commence collation of road traffic accident data, from both internal and external sources, and also to take interim responsibility for key performance indicators and coordination of intervention strategies. This early remedial action has resulted in the department securing vital road traffic accident data from the Road Safety Partnership which will help to inform future strategy.

Schools Education

4.29   The Service has been providing fire safety education in all schools within the two counties for over ten years. The "How To" Guide states we will deliver education to all Key Stage 2 children within the two counties. However, the Key Stage 1 & 3 groups are not detailed even though resources have been produced for these groups.

4.30   Currently all Key Stage 2 children (Year 5) within the two counties receive fire safety education from Operational crews (whole time/day crewed station grounds).

4.31   The department's two education assistants deliver Key Stages 1, 2 & 3 within the retained areas of the two counties.

4.32   Although there are surveys completed at the end of each academic school year which evaluate delivery of subject matter and indicate that the training is very popular and well received there is little evidence to quantify success in terms of reducing risk within the two counties.

4.33   In addition to the above scheduled schools activity there are also certain ad hoc requests which come in and are supported by the department. These include, Key Stage 3 visits (hoax & arson messages), special schools requesting fire safety input and visits to schools to support citizenship, safety and emergency service days. It is identified that these are not part of any targeting in relation to risk.

4.34   Nursery packs, containing fire safety education resources for nursery staff to use, have also been developed and 60 nurseries are provided with this resource each year. Again, it is identified that this is not part of a targeted response and it is hard to identify a clear rationale for this area of work.

4.35   Young Citizen Challenge days have, for a number of years, been delivered in partnership with local schools in the Redditch and Trimpley areas. These events involve Year 6 students attending an interactive fire safety and arson road show and they have proven to be extremely popular with both students and teachers. However, once again, evaluation of their effectiveness has also proven difficult.

4.36   Bonfire Night is targeted annually via school assemblies with Year 7 and 8 students and 35 of the 53 schools in the two counties were visited in 2010 during October and November. Following the 2010 initiative the Community Safety Manager has commissioned a report on its effectiveness to inform a targeted approach for 2011. The 2005 statistics from the Primary Care Trust indicated that 28% of all accidents related to bonfires and fireworks were aged 13 and below.

4.37   Crucial Crew is another initiative delivered specifically in Herefordshire and targets water safety to Year 6 students. Whilst this initiative is once again popular with both students and teachers there is little evidence to confirm that the right target audience is being reached and that the intervention is reducing risk in the community. The "How To" Guide discusses delivery of water safety within the Service but there is little evidence to suggest the Service is delivering on its objectives based on real evidence.

4.38   There is currently a lead person assigned to the role of Education Officer to oversee the co-ordination of education in schools and this post was established at the inception of the Community Safety Department. The evidence suggests that the role of Education Officer was created to enable a programme of schools education to be created and embedded within the Service. This programme is now considered to be normal business across the Service.

4.39   There is no evidence to confirm the rationale behind any of the schools education currently carried out by the Service.   The reasons why the programme has been centred around Key Stage 2 children and that a blanket approach has been taken is not clear. Operational activity shows that injuries in young children are not a particular problem for the Service and also they are not represented nationally. There is an argument that these children help to educate their parents and also the education from the Fire Service helps them in later in life; both of these theories are very difficult to prove and to date have not been proven.

4.40   This report makes it clear that information is available to the department to identify households which are vulnerable from fire; however, there is no evidence to suggest that this influences the Schools Education Programme for the department.

4.41   The current approach to fire safety education in schools is one of a blanket approach. This does not appear to be evidence led and does not represent a best fit of the Service's resources for driving down risk in the community. As with so many of the activities of the department, this area of work is not linked into an overarching strategy for reducing risk.

Water Safety

4.42   A water safety strategy is documented within the "How To" Guide. There is little evidence within the department's activities to suggest that the Service is fully delivering on its objectives set within the document.

4.43   There appears to be no clear structure to the delivery of water safety messages and no strategy as to where in the two counties such intervention should be delivered and to whom. Most of the work in this area is carried out in reaction to water related deaths and injuries and is sporadic in nature.

4.44   The Department does not currently have a lead person assigned to water safety and there are no performance indicators for this area of Community Safety.

4.45   Analysis of the Service's operational activity has revealed that water related incidents where injury or loss of life occurs, accounts for a very small portion of overall activity. This is why the evidence already discussed in this report does not include water related incidents in the four key themes. However, it is recognised that at certain times of the year, and in certain locations, water related incidents do become more prevalent and the risk to these specific communities increases. These times of year include periods of hot weather, flooding and cold spells where static water becomes frozen.

4.46   It is however recognised that there is a pubic expectation that a modern Fire and Rescue Service will have the capability to carry out some proactive risk reduction in this area as well as its emergency response arrangements.

4.47   Informally, the Service has committed to undertaking a number of water safety initiatives to react to incidents in an attempt to drive down the risk of future occurrence.

4.48   A blanket approach which is addressed throughout the calendar in all areas of the Service is not appropriate and does not fit the evidence led recommendations throughout this report. For this reason it is recommended that in future any activity in this area should only be considered if there is clear evidence and a strong case to suggest that Service intervention activities are necessary.

Safeguarding Children and Young People

4.49 The review has identified that Safeguarding is a statutory obligation for the Service which is governed by several pieces of legislation. The Service has a policy for this important area of work and to date all Community Safety personnel have been trained throughout the department. At the time of writing, nine referrals have been identified ensuring that the service maintains its commitment, under its statutory duty, to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

4.50 The department also attends quarterly meetings at Worcestershire's Safeguarding Children Board and there is a move to attend the same in Herefordshire in the future.

4.51 The evidence or rationale for such meetings is not apparent, although the Service does need to be informed in this area due to the nature of its work in prevention and intervention. In addition there is an expectation for the Fire and Rescue Service to engage and contribute to such meetings by key partner agencies due to the contact the FRS has with children in both the operational arena as well as in the prevention and intervention arena.

4.52 Despite the presence of a policy and training having been delivered to all staff, there is evidence to suggest that some areas of the policy are not being fully implemented or adhered to. In particular a recent review of the Young Firefighters Association has identified a lack of awareness of individual responsibilities.

4.53 The evidence does show that this area is a very small part of the Service's work. This area has particular relevance for Young Firefighters Association (YFA) activities and any other youth work which the department engages in. There is a link to Safeguarding of vulnerable adults and establishing this link could prevent duplication of work which includes training.

4.54 The evidence based priorities outlined by this report also have strong links to the requirement for youth engagement, particularly in the areas of Arson and Road Safety. Therefore, it should also be noted that the Service has ambitions to progress and enhance its youth work in the future, including involvement in such projects as the Phoenix Project and youth mentoring. For this reason the sound management of Safeguarding responsibilities must remain a high priority for the Community safety Department.

Arson Reduction / Fire Setters

4.55 The review has identified that there is no clear policy within the Service in relation to arson reduction although it is mentioned within the IRMP 2009-12 and the "How To" Guide and there is a dedicated Arson Reduction Manager post within the Community Safety Department's structure.

4.56   The importance of arson intervention work within Herefordshire and Worcestershire cannot be underestimated and this view has been arrived at by taking into account the negative impact of arson on local communities and the local infrastructure. Arson attacks on key premises within the community such as schools, community buildings and local businesses can be devastating in terms of disruption to people's lives and standard of living, as well as the hidden costs to the local economy and prosperity of the area. In addition, deliberate secondary fires and increased incidents of arson within the community can have a very negative psychological affect on residents which can adversely reduce quality of life. With this in mind, the Fire and Rescue Service's role in contributing to arson reduction is clear and understandably it is an expectation of partner organisations, political leaders and the wider community.

4.57   In order to address the issue of arson and deliberate firesetting, the Service provides the local Community Safety Partnerships in both Worcestershire and Herefordshire with details of deliberate fires on a monthly basis.   The partnerships have the ability to map the data and these are returned to the Service and cascaded to the Districts.

4.58   It was noted that although information is available on a monthly basis to our partners, the Service does not have a robust system for monitoring and evaluating arson for ourselves within Herefordshire and Worcestershire although recently as a direct result of this review the Community Safety Manager has introduced greatly enhanced arson monitoring procedures which are starting to drive more proactive intervention activities.

4.59   The Service currently also has links into the CDRPs in Worcestershire and MATAK in Herefordshire to work with our partners to reduce arson.

4.60   In working alongside our partners, the Service has supported two arrests in Kidderminster, three in Redditch and two in Hereford. Working with the Police to arrest suspected arsonists is a key part of Fire Investigation, however, there is no formal link between the Community Safety Department and Fire Investigation.

4.61   The department has also been instrumental in having derelict and void buildings within the Lowesmoor area of Worcester demolished, after a spate of deliberate fires.

4.62   Arson is the number one cause of fire in the UK (Arson Control Forum annual report 2008-09). The evidence also indicates there are strong historic links between economic downturn and a rise in arson levels.

4.63   Successes in reducing arson appear limited across Herefordshire and Worcestershire however deliberate fires do appear to be reducing. There is little evidence to suggest that this is due to the Service's arson reduction work but this cannot be discounted.

4.64   The Service does not have a clear arson reduction strategy. This has resulted in an ad hoc approach to arson reduction centred on reactive work.

This approach is very difficult to attribute to an improvement in the reduction of arson. Finally Central Government continue to predict a rise in arson crime over the coming years as the economic outlook for the Country continues to be bleak. For this reason it is recommended that arson reduction should not only be maintained but it should in fact become one of the four primary activities of the Community Safety Department going forward.

Volunteer Programme

4.65   The Service's Volunteering scheme currently includes 32 volunteers, working in all three District areas. Fire Service volunteers provide a valuable support function to a wide variety of front line services and in particular they are available to assist with the delivery of community fire safety intervention activities and are considered to be an important resource of the CS Department.

4.66   The volunteers are often supervised at events by a Community Safety Advisor from one of the three Districts. Overall management of the programme and the volunteers themselves is carried out by the Volunteer Coordinator role based at Service Headquarters in the Community Safety Department.

4.67   A number of options had initially been developed to enable expansion of the volunteer programme subject to organisational need including:

- Reach the target of between 30 – 40 volunteers within the Service
- Increase numbers to between 80 – 100 by the end of 2012
- A major expansion as with other FRS's around the country to between 100 – 500 volunteers

4.68   Currently the Service is undertaking the first option. The evidence suggests that the volunteer programme is successful and has the potential for development. This is further supported by National Guidance which encourages the exploration of the use of volunteers.

4.69   However, the review has identified that they are not currently being utilised to maximum effect with regard to supporting the four key priorities identified

4.70   The review has also identified that in order to achieve this essential re-focus coordination of their activities would be better placed under the control of the local Community Safety Advisors who work within the Districts. This change of line management is considered wholly achievable now that the Volunteer scheme is fully embedded within the Service. The Community Safety Advisors are considered to be the key outreach arm of the Community Safety Department and this is where volunteer work should be based. This proposal would unfortunately negate the need for the existing Volunteer Coordinator post which was primarily established to implement the Volunteer scheme. This assumption has been reflected in the proposed revised Community Safety Department Structure proposed on Page 4 Para 1.15 of this report.

Young Fire-Fighters Association

4.71   For many years the Service has hosted its own Young Firefighters Association with well established units based at both Droitwich and Redditch. The Service also has ambitions to extend the Association to include new units at Evesham and one or more sites in West District. The Young Firefighters Association is viewed by the Service, the community and political leaders as an excellent method of engaging, supporting and mentoring young people from a wide variety of different backgrounds to become responsible, self disciplined young adults. It also provides an early introduction into the workplace and introduces young people to the value of effective teamwork, responsibility for their own and others health and safety whilst at the same time providing them with a personal sense of self worth and high self esteem.

4.72   The YFA is also a tool to support the Government's Young Persons' strategy but there is limited evidence to suggest that those young people are from vulnerable backgrounds or from areas of social deprivation. At present the Droitwich Branch currently has 30 young people, two of which have severe learning difficulties and one with behavioural problems. Redditch currently has 24 young people, two of which have learning difficulties.

4.73   The Department for Communities and Local Government have announced that they will not take forward the FRS Strategy for Working with Children and Young People. CLG have stated that while they recognise the valuable and worthwhile work that the FRS delivers in this area, development of future strategies in this area should be conceived and driven forward at the local level.

4.74   It should also be noted that current methods of recruitment come from word of mouth and CSA's promotion at Community events rather via a structured, targeted approach.

4.75   The review has identified that there is currently no clear strategy in relation to the YFA. Individual branches are run in different ways in the absence of standard protocols and each relies heavily on goodwill and the contribution of many volunteer staff.

4.76   It is generally accepted that the YFA is an excellent way of engaging with the youth element of the community and can add very tangible improvements to the overall community safety agenda. However, it is equally important that the Service recognises the inherent risks associated with these kinds of projects. Robust governance is required to meet the moral and legal obligations of the Service and if the YFA is to have maximum effect, targeted recruitment to include those from the highest risk communities must take place in future. The report therefore recommends that there is a complete review of the YFA to include development of a clear strategy for YFA going forward and this should be supported by organisational policy where appropriate.

Community Safety Advisors

4.77 The Service currently employs four Community Safety Advisors, two CSAs are located in North District and one each in South District and West District respectively. The role of the CSAs is to engage with the local community and local Partnerships to deliver Fire Service community safety messages as well as to support the wider community safety agenda. The CSAs also play a major role in supporting and directing local crews to deliver effective community safety campaigns, HFSCs and Station Open Days. The CSAs are considered to be the primary means of outreach within the local community for the FRS.

4.78 Whilst the CSAs make every effort to target the most "at risk", these groups are not categorised on the community safety event booking form. This booking form is designed to help focus the CSAs on their prevention activities and is therefore an important tool in delivering effective intervention within the community. The absence of clear direction and identification of "at risk" groups on the form results in tenuous reasoning to attend different events and does not promote targeting of the vulnerable and most at risk. The events booking form does include a section on "target audiences" but this is seldom completed, relying on the age bracket targeting for demonstration of reasoning.

4.79 Another issue affecting the performance of CSAs is the apparent lack of support for community intervention events. In 2011 there will be an estimated 100 events creating 258 days where support is needed. It is noted that the existing events booking form is considered to be unfit for purpose and may be the reason why capacity issues occur to support events fully.

4.80 In 2009, 125 days of support was required for events and in 2010 this rose to 189 days. With a predicted figure of 258 days for 2011, it is clear that event support is on the increase. It is clear from examination of the CSA role and the event booking form used to focus their activities, that a review of the way in which events are managed and prioritised is required.

4.81 This review has analysed the role of the CSA and recognised their invaluable contribution to the Community Safety Department and delivery of the community safety agenda. It therefore supports their existence in the Service both now and in the future and this has been reflected in the proposed new Community Safety Department structure detailed on Page 4. However, currently the CSAs are line managed centrally by the department, although they are based locally within their respective Districts, and this arrangement is considered to be the most effective and consistent way of ensuring delivery of organisational policy. It has also been noted that whilst the Service has historically employed four CSAs, this level of establishment is considered to be too high in the current climate and therefore it is recommended that the CSA establishment is reduced from four to three with one CSA remaining in each District. This proposal can easily be achieved as currently two of the CSAs are employed on a temporary contract to cover two existing vacancies.

Administration

4.82   The current Community Safety Department structure includes two administrator posts that were originally established purely to coordinate the booking and administration of Home Fire Safety Checks. These posts are currently line managed by the Senior Fire Safety Administrator. This senior post manages both Community Safety and Technical Fire Safety issues and is based in the CS department at SHQ. This role has grown substantially over recent years, particularly with regard to database management and supervisory responsibilities.

4.83   A number of processes in the administration area of the department are now considered to be antiquated and labour intensive and include recording of annual leave and a wide variety of paper based systems for HFSCs. As detailed on Page 25, Para 4.7, the department has recently procured Pinpoint which will be the key source of data upon which all HFSC and many community safety strategies are based in the future. This vital software along with another organisational database CFRMIS now requires dedicated management and administration.

4.84   The role of Senior Fire Safety Administrator is no longer effective due to the growth of Community Safety both nationally and locally. Therefore this area needs to be reviewed to allow adequate resources to be allocated to both the Community Safety and Technical Fire Safety Departments.

4.85   As a direct result of this review a proposal was put to the SMB in June 2011 which proposed a permanent restructure of the Senior Administration post within the Community Safety Department as not to progress this important issue would have resulted in unnecessary difficulties for the department. The proposal was agreed and supported by the SMB and the paper can be found at Appendix 3.

Partnership Working

4.86   Partnership working has become fundamental in achieving the Service's strategic goal of making Herefordshire and Worcestershire communities safer. The National Guidance, described in detail in Part 3, makes it clear that the Fire and Rescue Service is expected to engage in various partnerships, at varying levels to help improve society as a whole.

4.87   The review of the Department's current activity shows a disjointed approach that often works in isolation from the activities of the Districts. This isolation of activity is further compounded by the lack of a well communicated strategy to ensure that all areas are working towards a common goal when engaging in partnerships.

4.88   It is not clear whether existing partnerships were evaluated when they were established however, it is clear that there is no process of on-going Partnership evaluation to ensure that each and every one is still of value to the Service.

4.89   The Service has a statutory obligation to attend Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and these are currently attended by local Station Commanders. These groups take a multi-agency approach to reducing crime and anti-social behaviour and are often used by the Service as a vehicle for reducing arson. The CDRPs are considered to be the most effective method of Partnership engagement and many tangible benefits have been realised via this level of engagement.

4.90   The Service currently employs a member of staff in the Performance and Information Department to evaluate partnerships. However, historically this has been at a strategic level and little or no consideration has been given to the local partnerships which have been developed by both the Community Safety Department and Districts.

Community Safety Budget

4.91   Over the last ten years, as the emphasis on Community Safety and prevention activity has increased, so has the finance allocated to it. At the time of commissioning this report, the budget for Community Safety had risen to £339,000 for the year 2010/11.

4.92   Upon investigation it became apparent that, in a similar way to the structure of the department, the budget was based around past priorities and projects and without a clear rationale. The budget had grown over the years resulting in multiple budget lines and areas of spending that no longer reflected the strategic imperative of the organisation.

4.93   By 2010 the control of the budget had become devolved to supervisory members of the team and spending was seen as a task to be completed prior to the end of the year rather than a carefully considered tool for driving down risk. Lead personnel for references in the department were empowered with what they considered to be their 'own budget' which was to benefit their area of work. Little or no supervision, guidance or audit was given by the budget holder to control spending.

4.94   A change in Head of Department in December 2010 gave the opportunity to review the way in which the Community Safety Budget was controlled and this coincided with a pressure on the Service to review all budgets with a view to return efficiency savings.

4.95   With this in mind a comprehensive review of the budget was carried out. The methodology was clear:

- To examine each line of the budget and challenge how the spending had driven down risk in the community
- To examine the spending protocols including authorisation for spending
- To incorporate the priorities identified in this review, ensuring that the budget reflected the need to resource these areas effectively

4.96   The outcome of this review was that the Community Safety Department could return a saving of £189,000 year on year for the Service.

4.97   The changes to the budget were implemented on the 1st of April 2011 and the department now also benefits from very strict management and control of spending. Lead references are no longer authorised to spend and work on the basis of a 'zero budget'. All spending is authorised by the Head of Department and this is done in the evidence led manner identified by this report.

Summary of Recommendations for Community Safety Methods of Delivery

Home Fire Safety Checks

- The CS Department should utilise Pinpoint to identify those most at risk from fire and target them as a priority. In some cases a lower level of prevention work may be suitable for a lower level of risk

- Set up data exchange agreements with relevant partners and agencies to target vulnerable people

- The HFSC Technicians and/or the Volunteer Programme could be extended to provide a cost effective solution in RDS locations

- Broader engagement with community groups and organisations needs to be developed to identify vulnerable people e.g. Older Persons Forums

- Determine a communication programme by researching ways in which vulnerable people want to receive information and advice

- A set procedure should exist to establish the causes of all fire related deaths and injuries, working closely with Fire Investigators

Road Safety

- A framework for delivery of Road Safety Strategy needs to be created to reflect the findings of this review

- Determine success of the "Dying to Drive" initiative and consider the possibility of using it to educate an age group closer to that of young drivers

- Evaluate the Sixth Form trial in Worcestershire to determine if it has been successful and if so, incorporate into strategy

- Determine the best method of quantifying success of strategy

Schools Education

- A framework for delivery of Schools Education Programme should be part of the strategy that has been reviewed and updated to inform the findings of this report

- Tools such as Pinpoint and Mosaic should be used to identify the children of those households most vulnerable from fire rather than a blanket approach of visiting all schools

- Develop a programme which allows resources to be made available to Nursery staff based on targeting those most at risk

- The bonfire initiative should be targeted based on the recommendations of the evaluation of the 2010 report and this model should be followed for all further seasonal initiatives

Water Safety

- The Service should consider the development of proactive, evidence based, seasonal water safety campaigns which target known at risk groups and individuals.

Safeguarding Children and Young People

- Safeguarding children and adults should be managed and maintained centrally as reference of the CS Department but the need to hold a place on a Board needs to be reviewed

- A comprehensive review of the policy is required to ensure all areas of responsibility are being discharged and consideration given the relationship with Safeguarding of Adults

Arson Reduction

- Develop a framework for delivery of Arson Reduction

- Develop a robust system for monitoring and evaluating areas of concern in relation to deliberate fires allowing for proactive and reactive initiatives to be created

- To allow reductions in fires to be attributed to work carried out by the department proactive and reactive monitoring of operational activity must take place

- Stronger links to Fire Investigation need to be developed to share intelligence

- Maintain the Arson Reduction work already delivered and look to strengthen successes

- Include the Juvenile Fire Setters education programme in the Arson Reduction Strategy and include a separate programme for Adult offenders

Volunteers

- A Volunteer framework for delivery should be developed to reflect the findings of this review and include the local management of Volunteers to provide further integration

- Determine Volunteer involvement within the Service in supporting the reduction of risk and match numbers of volunteers to the level of involvement

- Utilise the skills of Volunteers to meet the needs of the community

Young Firefighters

- Complete a review of the YFA to include recommendations to move forward in line with the Service's strategic objectives

- Determine a framework for delivery of YFA to be supported by policy if required, reflecting the outcomes of the review

- Determine a methodology for recruitment that best represents those most at risk within the community

Community Safety Advisors

- Develop a framework for the delivery of events in line with the outcomes of this review

- Update the events booking form to confirm target audiences

- Determine line management of CSA's for improved effectiveness

- Develop an evaluation tool to determine the successes of event

Community Safety Department Administration

- Administration for the CS and TFS department needs to be reviewed in its entirety. This review should recommend a structure that allows both departments sufficient resource for its day to day operations

- The administration area of the Community Safety Department needs to incorporate the procurement and operation of Pinpoint

Partnerships Engagement

- A full review and evaluation of all Partnerships attended by the Community Safety Department needs to be conducted to ensure that they meet the strategic needs of the Service

- Co-ordination of partnership activity needs to be the responsibility of the Community Safety Department, ensuring that local representatives are Working towards the Community Safety strategy

Community Safety Budget

Summary of Achievements:

- A saving of 55% in the annual budget for the Department

- A culture of spending to reduce the risk in the community

- Strict regulation and control of the budget by the Department Head

- Budget lines which reflect the priorities of the Service

5.   Conclusions

5.1   Prevention activity is a statutory obligation for the Service under the Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004. The National Guidance (discussed in Part 3) confirms that prevention is at the heart of each Fire and Rescue Service but each FRS has the autonomy to conduct community safety work as they see fit.   However, each FRS must ensure that their prevention work is based on a targeted approach to reducing risk, identified within the service area.

5.2   The current work delivered within the department is wide ranging but lacks an evidence based approach and does not always maintain a targeted methodology to reducing risk. There is little evidence to suggest that delivery of Community Safety has been part of any formal evaluation to determine the level of success post delivery.

5.3   This review has identified that the Service's priorities, in terms of reducing risk, lie under four main headings:

- **Accidental dwelling fires**

- **Road safety**

- **Arson reduction**

- **Elderly/vulnerable**

5.4   **Accidental Dwelling Fires**

    5.4.1   Through the research carried out in Part 3, the Service now has a clear understanding of which risk groups should be targeted as a priority. The risk groups identified are *lone person* households and *single parent* households which largely mirror the national picture.   The groups are not only at disproportionately greater risk of accidental dwelling fires, but also at greater risk of injury.

    5.4.2   Demographically, both nationally and locally, the numbers of these two categories are increasing dramatically which further indicates the need to prioritise. Although there is a strong correlation between these two groups having accidental dwelling fires, this is further enhanced by the strong correlation between fires and areas of deprivation. Therefore, those risk groups highlighted who also live within the two counties' areas of deprivation, are a particular priority.

    5.4.3   We are able to identify a fairly clear picture of the current situation and a reasonable indication of what the future might look like, helping to identify which aspects are most likely to be of particular note for the Service:

5.4.4

- An ageing population

- More people living alone

- An increased number of single-parent families

- Key areas where a range of deprivation indicators are apparent

5.4.5 Cooking is the most common cause of fires within the home locally. Of those cooking fires over half occur in lone person households. This is further enhanced by cooking appliances being responsible as the source of ignition in 60% of all accidental dwelling fires.

5.4.6 Locally there appears to be a greater risk of injury in accidental dwelling fires when 'human factors' are involved. Two of the four fire fatalities, which occurred between 2009 and 2011, were recorded as being 'under the influence' and affected by medical conditions/illness. With the two counties both projecting the number of older people to increase at the greatest rate in the next 20 years, they also expect the number of older people affected by age-related impairments to also increase.

5.4.7 The Community Safety strategy currently appears to be focused on bringing down the number of house fires as a whole, rather than on reducing the risk for those most at risk and it is these people who suffer the greatest risk of death and injury in fires.

5.4.8 If the aim is to bring down the numbers of fatal and non-fatal casualties in home fires then this document provides good evidence on where community fire safety work needs to concentrate. Focusing on the groups and areas that have been identified in the document should help to reduce the risk of fire incidents among those people considered to be at greatest risk.

5.4.9 This evidence gives a clear picture for the Service when determining what information to provide to target a reduction in accidental dwelling fires.

5.5 **Road Safety**

5.5.1 The Service has recently continued to be a partner with Safer Roads. Road Traffic Collisions continue to be core business for the Service with, 1/12 of all incidents in the period 2010/11 being RTC's resulting in 585 injuries and 12 deaths.

5.5.2 There is little evidence to suggest that the work carried out by the Service in reducing RTC's within the two counties has been the result of a targeted approach and there is little evidence available which evaluates the successes of the work carried out to date.

5.5.3 The evidence suggests that although RTC persons trapped has fallen year on year, the number of RTCs which the Service attends has fluctuated. However, the risk groups concerned with RTCs continues to be the under 25 male drivers who have twice as many accidents than any other category compared to the population. The evidence also suggests that drivers are more at risk of serious injury in both cars and on motorcycles in Herefordshire.

5.6 Arson Reduction

5.6.1 The Service continues to have issues concerning deliberate fires with consistent pockets of activity within the two counties. This therefore continues to present an important area focus for the Service. As the Service looks to the future it is important to recognise that there are strong historic links between economic downturn and a rise in arson levels, which further emphasises the need for sufficient resources in this area.

5.6.2 A clear expectation of the community and the Service's partners is that the Service works to drive down the occurrence and impact of arson as part of an overall strategy to improve quality of life.

5.6.3 There is little evidence to suggest that internally, the Service has developed a robust system for monitoring and evaluating incidents of Arson. The Service is currently working reactively in this area and must now look to be proactive in reducing the incidents of Arson in times of austerity. This is particularly important when dealing with the commercial sector, where the Service's actions should reflect the moral and political expectation to support the local economy.

5.7 Elderly / Vulnerable

5.7.1 Nationally age is a significant factor in the risk of fatality in accidental dwelling fires, and the level of risk increases with age.

5.7.2 Locally, while the risk of older people experiencing an accidental dwelling fire is marginally greater than expected, the risk of older people sustaining an injury in a house fire is much higher. Fire investigations have shown that the survivability of 'like for like' injuries decreases with age, particularly concerning burns and smoke inhalation.

5.7.3 The evidence suggests that the relative risk of fire increases with age. Given the projected increase in the numbers of people aged 65+ in the

two counties. the number of older people at greater risk of fire and injury in fire is also likely to increase

5.7.4 Vulnerability factors can be numerous, but in simple terms are described as those that impair a person's ability to protect themselves from fire. Nationally, there is a high level of mental and/or physical impairment among fire fatalities. Age related impairments, such as dementia, attributes a significant risk of a fatal fire occurring. Locally, this correlation is just as prevalent, with more than half of the fire deaths being attributed to 'under the influence' and affected by medical conditions.

5.7.5 With the two counties both projecting the number of older people to increase at the greatest rate in the next 20 years, they also expect the number of older people affected by age-related impairments to also increase. This, unchecked, represents a significant risk of fire related injuries and deaths.

5.8 Existing Resource Deployment

5.8.1 The existing structure of the department does not reflect the four key priorities above and is a result of previous attempts to address the modernisation of the Fire Service in the last ten years. Resources are not proportionally matched to the priorities of the Service, i.e. risk, and rigid job titles and structures have not allowed for flexibility as these priorities have evolved. Resources have been allocated to establish or build new areas of work but then these resources or temporary structures have been left in place after the project has become core business.

5.8.2 Technology has not been fully utilised in the department with many paper based, labour intensive procedures still in place.

5.8.3 There has been no evaluation of events or work strands within the department which has made quantifying the successes and usefulness of work carried out in the department difficult. Future strategies and work strands should be evaluated in order to determine appropriateness and successes against the finding of this review. The attended events have been inappropriately targeted resulting in a department over subscribed to events with limited resources.

5.8.4 HFSC work is carried out by wholetime / day crewed stations with the Community Safety department responsible for the retained areas of the Service. There is a reliance on signposting and mosaic lifestyles data to access vulnerable persons but the Service must now look at ways of engaging with the vulnerable at source in order to drive down accidental dwelling fires. Communication programmes and engagement in community groups must be set up to assist in this.

5.8.5 Schools education has had blanket coverage at Key Stages 1, 2 & 3 with Key Stages 1 & 2 being delivered in retained areas only by the Community Safety department. Again there is little evidence to suggest the success of this in driving down risk or that it is part of a targeted response by the Service

5.9 **Proposed Resource Deployment**

5.9.1 The proposed resource deployment of this report is centred around the evidence within it, to specifically address the key Community Safety issues for Hereford and Worcester. It also retains the ability to be able to react and absorb changing priorities and targets in the future.

5.9.2 The principle of the deployment is to centre the resources around the Performance Indicators of the department, having lead individuals monitoring and reacting whilst also being proactive in these areas.

5.9.3 The deployment is able to free up resources by embedding areas of practice as core business, reducing labour intensive processes and using technology such as a fully electronic Home Fire Safety Check System which is targeted by demographic data.

6.   Recommendations

The table below provides details of all the recommendations for each of the sections covered by the review. The table is colour coded to status of each area - Not Yet Started (Red), Started But Not Complete (Amber) and Complete (Green). The table also identifies indicative implementation dates where appropriate.

Review Section	Recommendation	Current Position	Deadline Date
Community Safety Strategy	Clear frameworks of delivery created for all areas	Not yet started	**Jun-12**
	Develop an evaluation tool for all areas of work	CFOA Evaluation tool has been introduced	
	Adopt the four strategic priorities identified in this report	Not yet started	
	Adopt a targeted approach to all activity, prioritising those identified as 'at risk'	Not yet started	
	Develop a method of activity planning that takes into account of historical data and incident profiling	Initial discussions with P&I taking place	
Department Structure	Implement the structure as shown in Appendix Five	Some changes have taken place, not fully implemented	**Apr-12**

Review Section	Recommendation	Current Position	Deadline Date
Department Manager's Role	Establish a Station Commander B role	Temporary SC in role to cover non-uniformed establishment post	**Apr-12**
	Where practicable, this role should have the specialism of Fire Investigation	Not currently viable	
	Line management of this role to be aligned to current GC Technical Fire Safety	Not yet implemented	
Community Safety Methods of Delivery			
Home Fire Safety Checks	Utilise Pinpoint to identify those most at risk from fire and target them as a priority	Procurement and introduction complete, not yet fully implemented	**Jun-12**
	Set up data exchange agreements with relevant partners	Data sharing agreements with NHS and Age UK have been established, more are required	
	Explore the possibility of extending the HFSC Technicians or Volunteer Programme to provide a cost effective solution in RDS locations	Not yet started	

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Review Section	Recommendation	Current Position	Deadline Date
	Broader engagement with community groups and organisations	Not yet started	
	Determine a communication programme	Not yet started	
	Set procedure to establish the causes of all fire related deaths and injuries	Not yet started	
Road Safety	A Road Safety framework of delivery needs to be created	Not yet started	Apr-12
	Determine the success of current Road Safety initiatives	Work has commenced	
	Determine the best method for evaluating the success of Road Safety initiatives	CFOA Evaluation tool has been introduced	
Schools Education	A Schools Education framework of delivery needs to be created	Work has commenced	Apr-12
	Tools such as Pinpoint and Mosaic should be used to identify the most vulnerable from fire and target them as a priority	Targeting of school has started and will be reviewed to establish effectiveness	

Review Section	Recommendation	Current Position	Deadline Date
	Seasonal initiatives should be targeted and based on evidence including evaluation	Work has commenced	
Water Safety	Development of proactive, evidence based, seasonal campaigns which target those deemed to be most 'at risk'	Not yet started	Apr-12
Safeguarding	Safeguarding children and adults should be managed and maintained centrally by the CS Department	Work has commenced, Policy and Training to be reviewed	Apr-12
	A Comprehensive review of the policy is required	Work has commenced	
Arson Reduction	An Arson Reduction framework of delivery needs to be created	Not yet started	May-12
	Develop a robust system for monitoring and evaluating areas of concern for deliberate fires	Not yet started	
	Establish proactive and reactive monitoring of operational activity	This is now embedded as a working practice in the Department	

Review Section	Recommendation	Current Position	Deadline Date
Arson Reduction	Develop links to Fire Investigation to share intelligence	Work has commenced	May-12
	Maintain the Arson Reduction work delivered and look to strengthen its successes	Work has commenced	
	Include programmes for Adult and Juvenile Fire Setters in the framework of delivery for Arson Reduction	Adult Fire Setter Pilot to be completed 2012 and incorporated as appropriate into framework for delivery of Arson Reduction	
Volunteers	A Volunteer framework of delivery needs to be created to include local management of volunteers	Not yet started	Jun-12
	Determine the level of Volunteer involvement required to support the reduction of risk and recruit accordingly	Work has commenced	
	Utilise the skills of the Volunteers to meet the needs of the community	Skills database being established as part of web management software	

Review Section	Recommendation	Current Position	Deadline Date
Young Firefighters	Complete a review of the YFA	Complete	**Jun-12**
	Determine a framework of delivery for YFA to be supported by policy if required, reflecting the outcomes of the review	Not yet started	
	Determine a methodology for recruitment that best represents those most at risk in the community	Not yet started	
Community Safety Advisors	Develop a framework of delivery for events in line with outcomes of the review	Not yet started	**Apr-12**
	Update the events booking form to confirm target audiences	Complete	
	Determine the line management of CSAs for improved effectiveness	This has been addressed in an interim structure pending approval of the structure recommended in this report (Appendix 5)	
	Develop an evaluation tool for events	CFOA Evaluation tool has been introduced	

Review Section	Recommendation	Current Position	Deadline Date
Administration	Complete a review of Administration for CS and TFS and recommend an appropriate structure	Complete	Apr-12
	Incorporate the administration of Pinpoint in the structure of CS Administration	This is reflected in the structure recommended in the review but has not yet been implemented	
Partnerships	Complete a review of all Partnerships to ensure they meet the strategic objectives of the Service	Not yet started	Jun-12
	Co-ordination of Partnerships should be managed centrally by the CS Department	Not yet started	
Budget	Achieve a reduction in budget of approximately 50%	Complete	Complete
	Target spending to reduce risk in the community	Complete	
	Strict regulation and control of the budget by the Department Head	Complete	
	Amend the budget to reflect the priorities of the Service	Complete	

Part 3

Research

The following sections detail the research which forms the basis of this report.

Review of National Guidance

In order for the Service to understand its responsibilities under the community safety banner, the report reviewed national guidance. There are requirements for the Service to undertake Community Safety work with prevention being a key element. The findings below are broken down into guidance documents detailing the main elements but should be noted that although prevention is at the heart of the Fire and Rescue Services – how we do so is down to the Service, but ensuring that risk is reduced and the most vulnerable are targeted. The main headlines within the guidance's are detailed below.

The National Framework document provides the national focus for each FRS but the Localism Bill enables each FRS to address local priorities directly providing they benefit its functions (National Framework).

The National Framework Document 2008-11

Statutory responsibility for fire prevention work will remain at the heart of FRS activity in local communities.

FRSs will be seeking to influence the behaviours of groups within the community such as the elderly, people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, those living in poor quality housing, drug and alcohol users and those involved in crime and disorder.

FRSs will continue to work through CDRP's and Arson Task Forces to reduce arson and deliberate fires.

Localism Bill

General power of competence – "stand alone Fire and Rescue Authorities will be able to do anything, so long as they believe the activity to be connected with any of their functions as a FR Authority. The activity does not have to be a direct one: it is sufficient if the activity is intended to be beneficial to the performance of their functions."

CFOA's response to the Bill is that of a "cautious welcome" but due to the concern that national emergency response is not compromised as a result of it. They cite the wide range of community activities the FRSs are already at the heart of including working with children and young people, vulnerable adults, those with mental health issues, domestic violence victims and many more.

The LGA also welcomes the Bill and says it will mean FRAs will be able to respond to local issues and prioritise ambitiously – confident of their legal footing.

Fire Futures

Fire Futures was launched in July 2010 by Bob Neill MP and reviews the changing society – economically, politically, socially and environmentally and how each FRS will be required to change over time to meet the challenges faced in the future.

Fire Futures, four sector led reports have put forward a range of ideas on how the Fire and Rescue sector can work together to address current and future challenges.

Demographically, the 60-90+ age ranges are growing. The number of non English speaking residents is increasing. The number of traveller sites is increasing. High levels of drug and alcohol abuse continue to lead to an increase in the number of people at risk to themselves and others.

Economically and in times of continuing austerity – household income is falling for many and will continue to fall. This will mean people are likely to cut back on "luxuries" resulting in a possible increase in domestic fires.

Climatically, heath land and forest fires will continue to rise, threatening property in some instances. Floods will continue to be more frequent and severe.

Rising levels of Arson continue to cause concern.

The role of community volunteers in the delivery of prevention, protection and response must be taken forward.

Rising to the challenge

FRS's are widely praised for their contribution to the community in a variety of projects.

Better strategy and evaluation are required to ensure that FRSs are getting value for money from their community work.

Marmot Review

The Marmot Review was asked for by the Secretary of State for Health to propose the most effective strategies for reducing health inequalities. The Review ensures each FRS is recognised in addressing health and wellbeing issues.

Reducing health inequalities is a matter of fairness and social justice.

The lower a person's social position, the worse his or her health. Action should focus on reducing the gradient of health.

To concentrate purely on the most disadvantaged would not reduce health inequalities sufficiently.

To reduce health inequalities will require six policy objectives; give every child the best start in life, enable all children, young people and adults to maximise their capabilities, create fair employment, ensure healthy standards of living, create and develop healthy and sustainable places and communities and strengthen the role and impact of ill health prevention.

CFOA response – recognises the role that the FRS plays in tackling the wider factors that affect health and wellbeing.

National Older Persons Strategy

The document outlines the UK Fire & Rescue Services strategy to meet the challenges of protecting an ageing population.

The projected increase in the ageing population has been reviewed in section 5.3 "existing and predicted demographical information".

The ageing population requires the FRS to carefully consider community fire safety for this demographic by firstly identifying the vulnerable (section 5.3) and establishing their needs.

The Service must engage with community groups and organisations as part of their general community safety work and continually evaluate its performance.

Other Services have utilised establishing "older persons' forums" and have become engaged with older persons groups to respond to their needs.

FRSs must research ways in which older persons want to receive information and advice and build a communication programme accordingly.

Data sharing protocols will need to be established where appropriate with organisations such as the NHS, DWP, local councils, community nurses, carers and civil society organisations in order to access information on the vulnerable and where they are.

Providing training to partner agency staff so they are able to recognise fire related hazards is a way forward. This will assist in referrals to the FRS in the more complex cases but in the simpler ones provide partner agencies to provide simple and immediate interventions.

Existing and Predicted Demographical Information

National guidance indicates that society in general is to change dramatically over the next 20 years. Changing demographics with large increases in vulnerable groups will have an impact on how each FRS will conduct its community safety work and strategies in the future and will need to represent this change. The information below was taken from national guidance and local data sets and will give the service an indication of what the two counties will look like in the future.

Herefordshire and Worcestershire councils have made a number of population projections into the future – in some areas as far as 2033 – in order to try to identify what it might look like, how many people there will be, how many households, how many people will be likely to need some form of public service support, etc.

The population projections are based primarily on three main factors; births, deaths and migration. This gives an indication of the future numbers of people and households, rather than an accurate prediction.

Other factors will also influence the future size of the population, including local and national policies, economic factors and the overall land capacity to accommodate population.

The projections give us further information about what lies ahead and can help us to consider how this might affect the Service. Some of the more significant projections are as follows:

The overall population of the two counties is projected to grow by around 54,000 people between 2008 and 2026, from 734,600 people to 783,600 (a 7% increase).

The population of Worcestershire is projected to grow from 552,000 in 2008 to 590,000 in 2026, and to almost 605,000 by 2030

The population of Herefordshire is projected to grow from 177,800 in 2008 to 193,600 in 2026

The total number of households is also projected to rise by 48,000 households over the same period, from 313,000 in 2008 to 361,000 in 2026.

There are projected to be 269,000 households in Worcestershire in 2026 (an increase of 34,000 over 2008 – 14%), and 92,000 households in Herefordshire in 2026 (an increase of 14,000 over 2008 – 18%)

The projected household increase up to 2026 is just 6,000 less than the projected population increase. This is largely due to a predicted increase in the number of one-person households. By 2033, it is predicted that there will be 150,000 one-person households across the two counties, a 56% increase over the 96,000 one-person households in 2008

Though figures are not readily comparable, the increase in the number of one-person households coincides with a projected increase in the number of people aged 65+ living in the two counties. By 2026 the number of people aged 65+ is estimated to reach 221,000 people, an increase of 55% over the 143,000 people aged 65+ in 2009.

By 2026, almost one in three Herefordshire residents will be aged over 65 years

More than one in four Worcestershire residents will be aged over 65 years by 2026, though in districts such as Malvern Hills and Wychavon this figure will be nearing one in three residents.

Though of a smaller scale overall, the number of lone-parent households is also predicted to rise: between 2008 and 2033, it is estimated that there will be 25,000 lone-parent households in the two counties, an increase of 6,000 (32%) from 2008.

Herefordshire Council has noted that the ageing population will add significantly to the number of people needing informal care from family and friends, and that it also means that the carers themselves will be older. In particular, the number of people aged 85+ is expected to double by 2026 to 10,200. This group makes by far the greatest demands on health and social care and is at greatest risk of isolation and of poor, inadequately heated housing.

Other Local Factors

In addition to population and household projections there is also a wealth of data prepared by the councils in the two counties, which maps the prevailing circumstances in the local area. This can be useful when considering the Service's approach to issues such as targeting areas of highest risk and groups of the most vulnerable members of the community.

One particular factor is deprivation, and some particular examples are listed below:
In the Leominster Ridgemoor area, 41% of individuals live in income deprived households, and the Golden Post-Newton Farm area of Hereford City has 37%. Both areas also have high levels of health and employment deprivation.

Pockets of income deprivation can also be found in the market towns of Ross-on-Wye, Ledbury and Kington, and the villages of Whitchurch, Kingstone, Peterchurch, Weobley and Bartestree.

In Herefordshire, there are 14 Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) that are within the 25% most deprived nationally for income deprivation affecting older people aged 60 and over, with the Bromyard Central area in the 10% most deprived nationally.

Several rural areas where income deprivation affecting older people have also been identified – in or near Credenhill, Whitchurch (Goodrich Cross), Colwall and Clehonger.

Nearly half (48.6%) of all children in the Golden Post-Newton Farm area of Hereford City were living in poverty (2007-8 data).

In terms of crime, there are 7 areas in Herefordshire within the 25% most deprived nationally, of which 2 are in the 10% most deprived in England – Hereford City centre and Golden Post-Newton Farm.

LSOAs in Herefordshire are in the 25% most deprived nationally in terms of overall deprivation, with the Golden Post-Newton Farm area in the 10% most deprived nationally.

All 8 areas are within the urban areas of Hereford City and Leominster, but significant smaller pockets of deprivation can also be found in and around the rural areas of Whitchurch, Kingstone, Peterchurch, Weobley and the market town of Bromyard.

At November 2010, 11% of Worcestershire's workforce was claiming out of work benefits. While lower than equivalent figures nationally and regionally, there were three local areas where more than one in three residents of working age were claiming: Oldington and Foley Park in Wyre Forest (36.3%), Woodrow in Redditch (33.4%) and Warndon in Worcester (39.3%).

A quarter of the population of Herefordshire lives in very sparsely populated areas (the highest proportion of any county-level authority in England), and many face difficulty accessing key services. This is a particular issue for vulnerable groups and children and young people.

Taken together, these statistics and projections give us a fairly clear picture of the current situation and a reasonable indication of what the future might look like and help to identify which aspects are most likely to be of particular note for the Service: an ageing population, with more people living alone, an increased number of single-parent families, and key areas where a range of deprivation indicators prevails.

Correlations

One of the checks available to make sure that our priorities are targeted effectively is a series of statistical correlations that show whether or not there is a link between two events. So if one of these events is the incidence of fire and the other is any one of a number of social issues such as deprivation, then a calculation can be made to see if there is any correlation or coincidence between the two.

From national research studies, we are aware that some of the key factors linked to accidental fire deaths include living alone, limited physical mobility, alcohol and depression. We also know that many fire victims had some previous contact with other public services, such as social services.

Using this information and data from FRAs and local authority areas, a number of national level correlations can be demonstrated. Some of these are set out as follows:

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- There is a strong correlation between fires in the home and being a single parent
- There is a very strong correlation between the crime rate in an area and the number of deliberate fires
- There is a very strong correlation between the crime rate in an area and the number of deliberate car fires
- There is a strong correlation between the rate of dwelling fires in an area and the percentage of disabled or sick people in that area
- There is a strong correlation between the rate of dwelling fires in an area and the percentage of people not of good health in that area
- There is a strong correlation between the rate of dwelling fires in an area and the rate of unemployment
- There is a strong correlation between the rate of dwelling fires in an area and deprivation

A correlation does not mean that one event causes another – for example, the strong correlation between being a lone parent and the likelihood of experiencing a fire incident does not mean that being a lone parent causes you to have a fire; it means that areas with many lone parents may have more fires.

By looking at trends, projections, prevailing circumstances and correlations, we can begin to get a clearer picture of what the future might look like, and from this we can have more confidence when considering how we plan our strategies, set our priorities and organise our resources.

How does the Service decide on its priorities in relation to community safety and the people that live within it? Does it concentrate on reducing the number of fires in the home across the board, or does it want to reduce the risk for those people known to be most at risk of fire in the home?

If the aim is to bring down the numbers of fatal and non-fatal casualties in home fires then this document provides good evidence on where community fire safety work needs to concentrate. Focusing on the groups and areas that have been identified in the document should help to reduce the risk of fire incidents among those people considered to be at greatest risk.

Put simply: The CS strategy currently appears to be focused on bringing down the number of house fires as a whole, rather than on reducing the risk for those most at risk and it is these people who suffer the greatest risk of death and injury in fires

Fire statistics and national research into fire incidents tells us that some people are more at risk of being injured or killed by fire than others. The challenge for Community Safety is to identify who and where they are, and to put in place a strategy and action plans that help to make them less vulnerable to fire risk.

The findings from national studies and local studies carried out by individual fire and rescue services have helped to identify a number of key characteristics that make someone at greater risk of fire than others. These can be categorised under four main headings.

- **Lifestyle and life-stage**: this is about the way people live. Some people's lifestyle makes them more at risk of fire than others. Life-stage is about the stage of life a person has reached, from the very young to the very old. Lifestyle and life-stage also tells us about the person's social, educational, economic status

- **Household type**: the units people live in – family size and make up. It also relates to the characteristics of where people live, particularly the level of (multiple) deprivation

- **Vulnerability**: this considers those factors that affect someone's ability to protect themselves from fire, and include factors such as learning, physical, mental or sensory disability, and which often requires a high level of care

- **Attitude and behaviour**: this is about how concerned someone might be about the risk of fire, and can range from a lack of knowledge or understanding to behaviour that shows a disregard for personal safety.

The following table organises the key characteristics that fire victims have displayed into these four categories. These characteristics are interrelated and can often overlap into one or more categories, and a person at risk of fire might portray one or several of these characteristics.

Category	Characteristics	Other factors
Lifestyle and life-stage	▪ Age, especially older people ▪ Alcohol misuse ▪ Substance (drugs) misuse ▪ Smoking ▪ Hoarding tendency ▪ Unemployed	▪ Social isolation ▪ Poverty ▪ Poor education
Household type	▪ Single people living alone ▪ Lone pensioners ▪ Single parent families ▪ Living in one room ▪ Social renters	▪ Poor living conditions ▪ Levels of deprivation
Vulnerability	▪ Impaired mental capacity, including temporarily, such as caused by medication, alcohol or substances ▪ Taking medication, particularly if more than one and if sedative ▪ Sensory impairment ▪ Learning disabilities ▪ Poor mental or physical health ▪ Lack of physical mobility ▪ Age-related impairment (e.g. Dementia) ▪ Inability to take care of themselves ▪ Possible oxygen dependence	▪ Having poor or dangerous appliances ▪ Having had previous fire-related incidents ▪ Being known to other agencies
Attitude and behaviour	▪ Improper use of appliances (e.g. Cooker, heating, electrical items) ▪ Little or no fire safety awareness ▪ Negligence or other lack of concern with own or others' personal safety	▪ Not having a working smoke alarm

The research also shows that these factors not only contribute to the cause of a fire, but can also impair a person's ability to respond to a fire once it has started.

Household Composition

Nationally, single people living alone and single parent households are most at risk of fire.

Locally, single person and single parent households are not only at disproportionately greater risk of accidental dwelling fires, but also at greater risk of injury in those fires

The numbers of single person and single parent households are projected to increase at the greatest rate over the next 20 years. The implication is that there are likely to be more households at risk of fire in the future.

Age

Nationally age is a significant factor in the risk of fatality in accidental dwelling fires, and the level of risk increases with age.

Locally, while the risk of older people experiencing an accidental dwelling fire is marginally greater than expected, the risk of older people sustaining an injury in a house fire is much higher.

The evidence suggests that the relative risk of fire increases with age. Given the projected increase in the numbers of people aged 65+ in the two counties, the number of older people at greater risk of fire and injury in fire is also likely to increase.

Cause of Fire

Nationally while the most common cause of accidental fire in the home is the 'misuse of equipment and appliances' (most frequently cooking appliances), the single most common cause of accidental fatal fires in the home is the 'careless handling of fire or hot substances' (mostly the careless disposal of cigarettes).

The majority of accidental dwelling fires in the two counties are caused by cooking, with more than half of all cooking-related fires occurring in single person households.

Dwelling fire injuries were caused by the misuse of equipment and appliances in three of the four fire fatalities (April 2009 – March 2011) in accidental dwelling fires in the two counties, the cause of the fire was recorded as careless handling, while the other fatality was as the result of negligent use of equipment or appliance.

Source of ignition

Nationally the most common source of ignition in accidental dwelling fires were cooking appliances, accounting for over half of all ADFs, and for the majority of fire casualties. Although smokers' materials accounted for a much smaller proportion of all Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADFs), they accounted for by far the highest number of fatalities.

Locally cooking appliances were also the most common source of ignition in ADFs and also accounted for the majority of fire casualties. While the number of ADF fatalities is relatively low in Herefordshire and Worcestershire, two of the four deaths recorded smokers' materials as the source of ignition.

Impairment

Nationally there is a high level of mental and/or physical impairment among fatal fire victims. Age-related impairment is a significant factor in the risk of a fatal fire occurring.

Substance use (particularly alcohol), where the victim may be 'under the influence' at the time of the fire, is a common factor in accidental dwelling fire deaths. Alongside the immediate causes of a fire, alcohol, mobility and mental illness are the biggest single influences on whether a fire starts and/or whether it has fatal consequences.

Locally there appears to be a greater risk of injury in accidental dwelling fires when 'human factors' are involved. Two of the four fire fatalities were recorded as being 'under the influence' and affected by medical conditions/illness

With the two counties both projecting the number of older people to increase at the greatest rate in the next 20 years, they also expect the number of older people affected by age-related impairments to also increase.

Contact with other agencies

Nationally one in three fatal fire victims had been in contact with other agencies, such as social services. It is likely that people who have accidental dwelling fires will be known to one or more agencies.

Working in partnership with, and sharing information with, other agencies should help the Fire and Rescue Service to improve the targeting of community safety activities towards those most at risk of fire.

Analysis of Accidental Dwelling Fires in Herefordshire and Worcestershire against Risk Factors

This analysis looks at the incidence of these risk factors in accidental dwelling fires in Herefordshire and Worcestershire over a two year period (April 2009 – March 2011), in order to establish the extent of risk in the two counties and to support the development of community fire safety priorities.

Over the two year period, the Service attended 2,398 primary fires, of which 844 were dwelling fires, with 781 of these recorded as accidental dwelling fires (ADFs). This represents a rate of about one accidental dwelling fire per day, with ADFs comprising a third of all primary fires. 156 of the ADFs involved casualties, of which there were 211 persons injured. There were four fatalities among these 211 casualties.

As the number of fatalities and injuries in accidental dwelling fires is low across the Service area, and would not provide a robust sample, the total number of accidental dwelling fires has been used as a proxy sample.

The analysis is set out in 7 main sections: household composition, housing type, age, cause of fire, source of ignition, level of impairment and Human factors. It also looks at the impact of smoke alarms and contact with agencies.

Household composition

National fire statistics and studies suggest that single people living alone and single parent households are most at risk of fire. A representative study of 535 fatal Fire Investigation Reports mostly between 2002 and 2005 in the UK found that almost 75% of fatal fires involved single person households, while only making up about 30% of all households.

Of the 781 accidental dwelling fires in Herefordshire and Worcestershire, by far the majority involved lone person households; 310 incidents or 40% of all ADFs. This is disproportionate to the number of single person households, which make up about 27% of all households in the two counties.

By comparison, the next highest number of ADFs involved households with couples and dependant children, 129 incidents or 17% of all ADFs. Households with couples and dependant children make up about 19% of all households, so this appears to be more or less proportionate.

Households consisting of a lone parent with dependant children make up about 5% of all households, but with 73 ADFs this represents 9% of all ADFs. This appears to be disproportionate.

Further analysis of ADFs involving single person households shows that of the 310 incidents, 55% (171 incidents) involved single persons under pensionable age while 45% (139 incidents) involved single persons of pensionable age. This suggests that there is little difference in risk of fire according to the age of the single person householder. However, national research shows that age is a significant factor in the risk of injury or fatality in accidental dwelling fires.

Though the numbers involved in the two year period are small, there appears to be good evidence to suggest that the local findings are consistent with the national findings: single person and single parent households are at disproportionately greater risk from accidental dwelling fires in the two counties.

Household projections for the two counties over the next 20 years or so suggest that the greatest increases in household numbers will be in both single person and lone-parent households.

By 2033, the number of single person households is projected to rise from about 96,000 to 150,000, a 56% increase, while the number of lone-parent households rises from about 19,000 to 26,000, a 37% increase.

By contrast, the number of couples households is projected to rise by just 3%. Single person households are expected to make up 40% of all households in the two counties by 2033 with lone-parent households representing 7%.

The implication of the projected increase in numbers of single person and lone parent households is that there are likely to be more households at fire risk in the future.

Household composition and casualty numbers in accidental dwelling fires

Of the 781 accidental dwelling fires, 156 (20%) involved casualties, with 211 casualties in total. Of the 156 incidents, 80 were in single person households, just over half of all ADFs involving casualties.

There were 14 incidents in lone parent households involving 23 casualties, 9% of all ADFs involving casualties. These figures suggest that single person and lone parent households are not only at disproportionately greater risk of accidental dwelling fires, but also at greater risk of injury in those fires. Three out of the four fire fatalities occurred in single person households.

The local figures also show that lone persons over pensionable age had 20% of all accidental dwelling fire injuries.

Housing Type

In terms of housing type, the national study found that terraced housing is at marginally disproportionate risk of suffering a house fire. 33% of the fires in the sample occurred in terraced housing, whereas 27% of the population live in terraced housing.

For Herefordshire and Worcestershire the evidence from the sample of 781 accidental dwelling fires does not identify terraced housing as a property type; further interrogation of each incident would be required to establish this. The evidence records that 68% of the 781 ADFs occurred in houses (472 incidents) and bungalows (59 incidents) with one family household. Using the 2001 Census data, houses and bungalows make up about 87% of the overall housing stock in the two counties.

Accidental Dwelling Fires and Age

National research suggests that age is a significant factor in the risk of fatality in accidental dwelling fires. The research study found that the majority of fatal fires (19%) involved those aged over 80 years, with 63% of fires involving people aged over 50 years. It further found that the level of risk increases with age.

Those aged between 70 and 80 years are twice as likely to be killed in a house fire (16% of fire fatalities but only representing 7% of the population), and those aged over 80 years nearly five times more likely to be killed in a house fire than would be expected (19% compared with 4%).

The latest annual Fire Statistics UK 2008, published by the CLG in November 2010, recorded a total fatality rate of 7.3 deaths per million population (PMP), and a rate of 7.1 deaths per 1000 dwelling fires.

The highest fatality rate was found in people aged over 80 years at 25 deaths PMP, with those 65-79 years having a rate of 13 deaths PMP and those 60-64 years a rate of 9 deaths PMP.

Local data for the 781 accidental dwelling fires does not record incidents by age to any significant extent. The statistics do identify whether an accidental dwelling fire was in a household containing at least one person of pensionable age. Using this as a proxy, the statistics show that 193 of the 781 ADFs occurred in households with at least one person of pensionable age (25% of all ADFs), and of these 140 were people over pensionable age living alone. At 2008, there were 92,000 households in the two counties with people age 65 or over (29% of the population).

While this indicates that those households of pensionable age are marginally at more risk of experiencing an accidental dwelling fire, the local data shows that one in three of all those accidental dwelling fires where an injury is recorded were in households of pensionable age (55 out of 156 incidents).

This suggests that although the risk of older people having a house fire is marginally greater than expected, the risk of older people sustaining an injury in a house fire is much higher.

Population projections for the two counties suggest that the greatest increase will be in the 65+ age group. By 2030, the population of Herefordshire and Worcestershire is projected to reach around 806,000, an 8% increase over the 743,000 population in 2011.

At the same time, number of people aged 65+ is expected to increase. By 2030, 29% of the population of the two counties is expected to be aged 65+ (rising from 20% in 2011), and 11% of the population will be aged 80+ (rising from 6% in 2011).

While the local data is based on a relatively small number of incidents, there is evidence to suggest that the relative risk of fire increases according to age. Given the projected increase in the numbers of people aged 65+ living in the two counties, the number of older people at greater risk of fire will also increase.

Cause of Fire

The national study found that the single most common cause of accidental fatal fires in the home is 'careless use of smokers' materials,' 49% of all accidental fatal fires. Fires caused by chips pans/cooking were responsible for 18% of all accidental fatal fires in the home.

These findings are similar to the Fire Statistics UK 2008 figures, which reported that "the leading cause of fatal accidental dwelling fires was careless handling of fire or hot substances (mostly the careless disposal of cigarettes)," and responsible for 113 out of 294 (38%) accidental dwelling fire deaths, while fires started by cooking appliances were responsible for 44 deaths (15% of ADF deaths).

The local data for the two counties show that the majority of accidental dwelling fires were caused by cooking (249 out of 781 ADFs, which includes 40 cooking-related fires involving chip pans/deep fat fryers).

The local data also found that 17% (129 ADFs) were caused by a fault in equipment or appliance and 13% (101 ADFs) were caused by combustible articles too close to a heat source/fire.

More than half (130 ADFs) of the cooking-related fires were in single person households.

While the local data is not directly comparable with the national statistics, because of differences in the way the FDR1 and IRS systems categorise the causes of fire incidents, there are similarities that suggest that the local breakdown of causes of fire largely mirror the national picture:

Cause of fire and casualty numbers

Of the 781 accidental dwelling fires, there were 156 incidents where there were one or more casualties. In all there were 211 casualties including four fatalities.

The two most common causes of fire causing injury were 'misuse of equipment and appliances,' which includes cooking-related incidents, and 'careless handling of fire/hot substances', which includes the careless disposal of smoking materials. Together these accounted for over half of all persons injured, including all four fire fatalities.

In three of the four fatalities the cause of the fire was recorded as careless handling - due to sleep or unconsciousness (two incidents) and due to knocking over (one incident). The other fatality was as a result of negligent use of equipment or appliance (heat source).

Source of Ignition

The Fire Statistics UK 2008 report found that smokers' materials accounted for 2,800 (7%) of all accidental dwelling fires in 2008, but by far the most frequent source of ignition in ADFs were cooking appliances (22,200 in 2008, over half of all ADFs). This reflects the relatively minor nature of many cooking-related fires and the fact that many cooking fires occur when the victims are alert at the time of the fire.

The study of the 781 accidental dwelling fires in the Herefordshire and Worcestershire area found that cooking appliances were involved as the source of ignition in 377 fires, 48% of all ADFs. Smokers' materials accounted for 4% of all ADFs, with 35 incidents.

Source of ignition and casualty numbers

Nationally, the majority (53%) of casualties in accidental dwelling fires record cooking appliances as the source of ignition. This is mirrored locally, with 60% of all ADFs involving cooking appliances as the source of ignition.

The next most common source of ignition nationally and locally was smokers' materials with 12% and 10% of all sources respectively. Nationally, by far the highest number of fatalities occurred in ADFs involving smokers' materials as the source of ignition, with one-third of all ADF fatalities.

While the number of fatalities in Herefordshire and Worcestershire is comparatively low, two of the four ADF deaths recorded smokers' materials as the source of ignition.

Impairment

The national study of Fire Investigation Reports found that there was a high level of mental and/or physical impairment among fatal fire victims. The study found that age-related impairment was a significant factor in the risk of a fatal fire occurring and that substance use, where the victim may be (temporarily) 'under the influence' of a substance at the time of the fire, was also a common factor in accidental dwelling fire deaths.

The Fire Investigation Reports vary in the level and quality of reporting, but the details were sufficient enough to allow a number of conclusions to be drawn;

- **Mental impairment**: 15% of fire victims suffered some form of mental impairment, with depression the biggest single category. The National Institute of Clinical Excellence estimate that one in four people will experience some kind of mental health problem in the course of a year, and that depression tends to be more common among single persons living alone.
- **Physical impairment**: at least 30% of all fatal fires investigated involved at least one victim with a physical impairment, with 101 of the 535 fire deaths investigated involving victims with some form of limited mobility (inc. wheelchair users and people who are bedridden).
- The Department of Health estimate that 18% of the general public have either a moderate or serious disability, a rate that increases significantly with age: three-quarters of those aged over 85 have a disability.
- The Marmot Review of health inequalities 2010 found that more than three-quarters of the population do not lead a disability free life at the age of 68, and that those people living in the poorest neighbourhoods can have up to 17 more years living with ill health than those in the richest neighbourhoods. That is, people in poorer areas not only die sooner, but they will also spend more of their shorter lives with a disability.

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- **Age-related impairment:** 39% of the fatal fires investigated involved age-related mental and/or physical impairments, with elderly people making up more than one in three fire victims and young infants 4%. Studies have found that one in five older people living in the community and two in five living in care homes are affected by depression, and that one in ten children has a mental health disorder.

- Locally, it is expected that at 2011 there are 10,000 people aged over 65 years who are affected by dementia in the two counties, and that this is likely to double to around 20,000 people by 2030

- **Substance use:** In 251 fires (47% of the 535 fatal Fire Investigation Reports studied) the victim was impaired by a substance at the time of the fire. In the majority of these cases (178 or 71%), the person was suspected to be under the influence of alcohol; this shows that there was evidence that one in three of all fire victims was under the influence of alcohol. 65 victims were found to be under the influence of prescribed drugs (26% of cases involving substance use or just over one in ten of all fire victims). Just 7 victims were found to be under the influence of illicit drugs

The study further found that alcohol use was often associated with fires at weekends and during the night, and that substance use was strongly associated with 50-59 year-olds, but less common among the elderly.

In summary, nearly 80% of all fires involved victims who were impaired in some way, either through substance use, mental or physical impairment, whether or not related to age, or a combination of these factors.

The analysis also revealed that alcohol-related impairment was most prevalent in contributing to both the cause of a fire and as a factor affecting the response to the fire. Limited mobility was also significant as a factor in impeding effective response to a fire.

The study concludes that alongside the immediate causes of a fire, **alcohol, mobility and mental illness** are the biggest single influences on whether a fire starts and/or whether it has fatal consequences. The information available from the local data does not provide detail on impairment directly, but does highlight where 'human factors' were involved in the start of the fire. In most cases, no human factors were identified or were not known (476 or 61% of the 781 accidental dwelling fires). In all, human factors were involved in 305 (39%) of ADFs, with 'distraction' accounting for 41% of these fires. In 63 (8%), the data records that the start of the fire was linked to a person being asleep or falling asleep. Just 36 cases (5%) were recorded as involving persons with medical conditions/illness, a disability or a temporary lack of physical mobility. However, two of the four accidental dwelling fire deaths were recorded as having 'other medical conditions/illness.' Human factors were 'not known' in relation to the other two fire fatalities. 'Distraction' was the most prevalent human factor accounting for 34% of all casualties, followed by 'falling asleep/asleep' accounting for 20%.

'Human factors' and casualty numbers

Of the 211 casualties, 124 were recorded in the 305 accidental dwelling fires involving human factors.

By contrast, there were 87 casualties in the 476 ADFs where human factors were not recorded. This suggests that even though 'human factors' are involved in only two out of five ADFs, they account for three in five casualties. That is, there is a greater risk of injury in accidental dwelling fires when human factors are involved.

Of all human factors recorded, the most prevalent was 'falling asleep/asleep' accounting for 32 incidents and 42 casualties. Of these 26 incidents (81%) and 27 casualties (64%) occurred in single person households.

Human factors and 'under the influence'

The local data provides information on whether or not it was suspected that the person involved was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There were 56 accidental dwelling fires where someone was suspected to be under the influence.

Though this is a small proportion of all ADFs, the data shows that 34 of the 56 incidents involved someone falling asleep/asleep. Further analysis shows that there were 33 casualties in 26 incidents where the person was suspected to be under the influence, and that 21 of these casualties were in single person households of which the majority (18 of the 21) were under pensionable age.

This also includes two of the four fire fatalities, both who were suspected of being under the influence and affected by medical conditions/illness.

Although the numbers are small, the local findings confirm that human factors, particularly related to falling asleep under the influence of alcohol/drugs, is a significant risk factor.

Other Agencies

Although the data was limited, the national research found that one in three of the fatal fire victims had been in contact with an agency other than the fire and rescue service, for example social services.

The characteristics of those most at risk of fire suggests that they are very likely to be in contact with another agency, whether for health care, social welfare and benefits, support or other public service or charity.

The national research pointed to how to improve the targeting of community safety activities such as home fire safety checks to reach those at greater risk of fire, and suggested that partnership working with other agencies should help the fire and rescue service to reach those people.

Location of Fire Start

By far the majority of casualties in accidental dwelling fires occur in the kitchen, while most fatal fire deaths occur in the living room/dining room (47% of all fatal fire victims in the UK in 2008) and the bedroom/bedsitting room (33%).

While the local picture for Herefordshire and Worcestershire is based on only two years' data, this mirrors the national statistics.

Two of the fatalities which occurred in the living room were lone persons under pensionable age, while the fatality in the bedroom was a lone person over pensionable age.

Smoke Alarms

Nationally, over half of all fatalities in accidental dwelling fires occurred in fires without alarms. In most fatal fires (70% according to the national study), there was no immediate response from the victim, usually due to being asleep/unconscious or otherwise immobile due to some form of impairment.

In 17% of fatal fires, the victim's first response was to investigate or attempt to tackle the fire.

Fire Statistics UK reports that 91% of households have working smoke alarms. Locally, there has been a year on year reduction in the percentage of fires attended where no smoke alarm was fitted. Of the 781 accidental dwelling fires in the two counties, three-quarters (76%) had alarm systems present.

Profile of Typical Fire Victims

The national research suggests a typical profile of those people, whose lifestyles and particular characteristics and circumstances make them then majority of fire victims. They can be summarised as:

- Single persons impaired by substance, age or depression

- Carelessly ignited textiles in their immediate environment – often by a cigarette or other naked flame

- Failure to react effectively due to impairment, sleeping or lack of smoke alarm

- Fires discovered by a neighbour, visitor or passer-by (because the person is alone)

Taking this a step further, the findings suggest that those groups that are most at risk and who need to be targeted nationally and locally through community fire safety activities and campaigns should include:

- Elderly men with limited mobility, who smoke and who may be impaired by alcohol

- Depressed middle-aged persons, who are all alone at home

- Struggling single-parent families

- Single elderly women with limited mobility, living alone and impaired in some way, with fires due to careless use of cigarettes or cooking

- All age groups - those who fall asleep with no functioning smoke alarm

- Young or middle aged adults, with fires due to careless use of cigarettes (with or without alcohol)

- Young adults coming in after a night out drinking, making themselves some food and leaving the stove unattended

Where are the potential fire victims?

While national statistics and research studies help us to understand what the typical characteristics of those people most at risk of fire are, they don't necessarily tell us where they are.

With a population of around 750,000 people across the two counties living in some 320,000 households, and an accidental dwelling fire rate of about one a day, it would be extremely helpful if those groups most at risk of fire could be located so that the appropriate community fire safety activity can be best targeted. There are two important sources of information that can help: neighbourhood data and information held by other agencies.

Neighbourhood data

There are two main areas that can help to identify where those at most risk are: Mosaic lifestyle data and Index of Multiple Deprivation data.

Mosaic lifestyle data

Mosaic draws together a wide range of data and research from numerous sources, including demographics, socio-economics and consumer data, financial measures, property value and characteristics and location. The data is organised according to lifestyle types, and is aggregated into household types and groups. This can then be pinpointed by location, down to individual households.

By plotting household types onto a map of Herefordshire and Worcestershire, we can determine with some confidence where in the two counties the different types of households live. By overlaying this with the precise locations of each accidental dwelling fire, we can identify the types of households that are having fires.

Using three years worth of accidental dwelling fire data – some 1130 records – the model found that the fires occurred in all fifteen broad household types; residents of isolated rural communities had the most fires, 145 or 12.8% of all ADFs, while wealthy people living in the most sought after neighbourhoods had the least, 23 or 2% of all ADFs.

However, this tells us which groups had accidental dwelling fires and how many, but it does not identify the relative risk of fire between the groups. To do this, the data needs to add in the number of households represented in each group across the two counties. By comparing the number of accidental dwelling fires in each group with the number of households in those groups, the relative risks can be identified

Although "residents in isolated rural communities" households had the most accidental dwelling fires, it is "young people renting flats in high density social housing" households that are most at risk – i.e. even though they had nearly three times less fires than residents in isolated rural communities, they are close to three times more at risk, because of the relative number of fires per household that make up each group.

By mapping the households and using the Risk Score for each Group, we can get a picture of where in the two counties is most at risk according to the Mosaic model.

Appendix One shows the breakdown of households and their risk score. This tells us that although most accidental dwelling fires occurred in group A, B and M households, groups M, N and O are most at risk of fire across the two counties.

Comparing the household types within groups M, N and O with the list of typical groups most at risk of fire discussed earlier shows considerable similarity between the two, and suggests that targeting these groups will go a long way towards reducing their level of fire risk

Index of Multiple Deprivation data

The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2010 combines the most up-to-date information on income, employment, health and disability, education   skills   and training, barriers to housing and services, crime and living environment.

It uses the data to produce a ranking of all 32,482 Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in England, where a rank of 1 is the most deprived and a rank of 32,482 the least deprived. An LSOA is a geographical area containing a neighbourhood of around 1,500 people. The counties of Herefordshire and Worcestershire are made up of 477 LSOAs.

The IMD is a useful tool, because it helps to highlight those areas where there are correlations between the incidence of fire. Key correlations were set out in the CLG's Fire and Rescue Service partnership working toolkit which suggested the following:

- A strong correlation between the rate of dwelling fires in an area and deprivation

- A strong correlation between the rate of dwelling fires in an area and the rate of unemployment

- A strong correlation between the rate of dwelling fires in an area and the percentage of people not of good health in that area

- A strong correlation between the rate of dwelling fires in an area and the percentage of disabled or sick people in that area

- A strong correlation between fires in the home and being a single parent

- Statistics are often presented in quintiles (fifths), which are helpful where the data can be ranked. By ranking the IMD data for the two counties, the most deprived areas can be identified, some 96 LSOAs.

Pinpoint provides intelligent predictions on the amount of household fires likely to occur in any given area during a chosen period. These predictions are all based on intelligent variables such as incident, lifestyle, HFSC and NLPG data sets (including Mosaic and IMD mentioned above) that are automatically linked as they are uploaded and entered into the system.

Pinpoint users can increase the number of high risk household interventions and measure impact through changes in risk as each HFSC is completed and as incidents happen.

Pinpoint is a web based solution dedicated to automating and integrating the entire process of targeting risk in domestic dwellings. In addition, Pinpoint instantly reports the level of impact and shifting patterns of risk every time a single check is completed. The system will ensure that HWFRS always focuses household prevention activity in areas of the community that present the greatest risk.

Road Traffic Collisions

Looking at Service data, the number of RTCs the Service attends has fluctuated year on year from 2006-2009. However the number of RTCs Persons Trapped has fallen year on year. Looking at where the incidents are occurring, the main point of note is that there is a proportionately high number of RTC Persons Trapped on the A roads running out of Hereford into Ledbury, Leominster and Ross station grounds. The incidents occur predominantly at 08:00 and 16:00-17:00 hours with a smaller peak at 22:00 hours. A reduction in RTCs Persons Trapped may suggest that there is less risk of serious and fatal injury in the Service area.

The data from the Police (Stats 19) covers a 12 month period so we were not able to analyse year on year trends. However, there was a significant amount of qualitative data to profile drivers and casualties locally. There were 1,931 incidents, with 2% fatalities (32 people, including 4 pedestrians) and 11% seriously injured (212 people). 66% of drivers were male, with drivers under 25 having almost twice as many accidents as any other category compared to the local population, and suffering 2.5 as many fatalities. When looking at gender and seriousness of injury, 32% of fatal, 22% of serious and 35% of slight injuries being sustained by females. Females therefore are slightly over represented in slight and fatal injuries, but proportionately lower in serious injuries.

When separating cars from motorcycles, the proportion of under 25s experiencing fatalities in cars increases to 41% of all car fatalities. For motorcycles, those aged between 25-64 are most at risk of fatality, with under 25s making up only 17% of all motorcycle fatalities.

About 1/3 of all RTCs occur in Herefordshire, with proportionately more motorcycle RTCs occurring in Worcestershire than in Herefordshire. The proportion of those seriously injured is higher in Herefordshire than in Worcestershire, suggesting that drivers are more at risk of serious injury in both cars and on motorcycles in Herefordshire.

The majority of RTCs occur on A roads in Herefordshire. This is also true of Worcestershire, but there is a higher proportion of RTCs on unclassified roads in Worcestershire than in Herefordshire, with 7% of the RTCs occurring on Worcs motorways. Whilst the perception is that the country lanes are a risk in Herefordshire (and they do represent 24% of all RTCs), Worcestershire experiences more RTCs on unclassified roads both in real terms and as a proportion of all its RTCs, showing them to be a higher risk than might be expected.

When it comes to fatalities, in Herefordshire almost 90% occur on A roads, whereas in Worcestershire there is more distribution across different road types, with 44% occur on A roads, 31% on B roads and 13% on motorways. Again, unclassified roads are evident in Worcestershire's fatal injury statistics (also 13%) but there were no fatal injuries on unclassified roads in Herefordshire. This suggests that a driver is more at risk of serious or fatal injury in Worcestershire on unclassified roads than in Herefordshire, but more at risk of serious or fatal injury on A roads in Herefordshire than in Worcestershire. The age ranges are evenly represented across all roads types when they are compared to road types and fatal/serious injury. As seen earlier, the Service's involvement in RTC Persons Trapped mirrors this profile.

When reviewing speed limits, almost 50% of all RTCs occurred in 30 mile per hour (mph) zones, and just under 30% in 60pmh zones. Most of the injuries occurred in 30 mph zones, but if we look at just fatal and serious injuries, twice as many happened in 60mph zones as opposed to 30mph zones. 70 mph zones experienced the next highest number of fatal and serious injuries. There are some differences between the age of the driver and the speed zone in which they are involved in RTCs. Over 70s are involved in relatively few incidents, though proportionately they are most at risk of RTC at 20 mph and 50mph. For fatal and serious injury only, the

age groups are split evenly across all speed limits. It would seem then that 60mph zones are the most dangerous stretches of road, with a significant risk also in 30mph zones.50 mph zones seem to experience the lowest risk of serious or fatal injury, and this is true for drivers in all age groups.

In terms of when RTCs occur, 08:00 and 17:00 are the times of day when most RTCs occur, as is shown by the Service's own profile of involvement in RTCs. Of note is that between 20:00 in the evening and 04:00 in the morning drivers under 25 have the most RTCs, followed by 25-54 year olds. The proportion of RTCs experience by those over 25 is significantly higher at commuting time.

The final aspect of the profiling relates to drink-driving. 95% of all drivers tested negative. Under 25s represent 8% of those tested positive in their age group as opposed to 5% who tested positive aged between 25-54. However, over twice as many people aged between 25-54 were tested, making under 25s twice as likely to be over the limit than those aged between 25-54. 2% of those aged between 55-69 tested positive, with all those over 70 testing negative. It would seem, based on this evidence, that the younger the driver the more likely they are to test positive in a breath test.

Profile of operational activity with identification of existing and predicted areas requiring priority intervention

Between the period of April 2009 and March 2011 the Service attended 2,398 primary fires of which 844 were dwelling fires. 781 of these dwelling fires were accidental, meaning 63 were deliberate.

156 of the ADF's involved casualties resulting in 211 people being injured and 4 fatalities

The number of RTCs the Service attends has fluctuated year on year from 2006-2009. However the number of RTCs Persons Trapped has fallen year on year. Two thirds of all incidents occur in Worcestershire, mirroring the population split between the two counties.

In the period 2010-11, 1 in 20 incidents within the Service were accidental dwelling fires resulting in 44 injuries and 1 fatality. In comparison, 1/12 incidents were RTC's resulting in 585 injuries and 12 deaths

Between June 2005 and May 2010 there were 1,466 water related incidents, with 52 casualties (37 incidents) and 12 fatalities (5 incidents). The casualties represent 2.5% of incidents and the fatality incidents 0.3% of incidents.

Appendix Two shows that the numbers of accidental primary fires attended by the Service in recent years have remained stable despite Community Safety activity.

In recent years, discounting false alarms, the Service's busiest area of work operationally has been attending Special Service calls, in particular RTC Persons Trapped (Appendix Two, Fig. 1).

10. Appendices

Appendix One

Table 12: ADFs 2007-10 by Mosaic Lifestyle Group and all households in H&W

Mosaic Lifestyle Group	ADFs 2007-10	Hsehlds in each Group	Risk Score20 %**
A Residents of isolated rural communities	145	41,426	100.2
B Residents of small and mid-sized towns with strong local roots	102	43,590	67.0
C Wealthy people living in the most sought after neighbourhoods	23	6,936	95.0
D Successful professionals living in suburban or semi-rural homes	95	51,111	53.3
E Middle income families living in moderate suburban semis	66	32,669	57.9
F Couples with young children in comfortable modern housing	54	21,976	70.4
G Young, well-educated city dwellers	46	7,801	168.9
H Couples and young singles in small modern starter homes	74	15,919	133.2
I Lower income workers in urban terraces in often diverse areas	48	8,081	170.2
J Owner occupiers in older-style housing in ex-industrial areas	84	27,105	88.8
K Residents with sufficient incomes in right-to-buy social housing	75	20,372	105.5
L Active elderly people living in pleasant retirement locations	54	17,156	90.2
M Elderly people reliant on state support	140	16,647	240.9
N Young people renting flats in high density social housing	52	5,196	286.7
O Families in low-rise social housing with high levels of benefit need	72	7,628	270.4
U unclassified	0	95	0.0
	1130	**323,744**	

** Risk score is based on a formula comparing percentages of ADF's and percentages of households to derive relative risk levels

**Fig 1.** **A breakdown of the main incident types between January 2006 – December 2009**

Fig 2. **Incident types as a percentage of all incidents by year**

The graph below shows the actual number of incidents as well as the percentage of all incidents each incident type represents. For example, False Alarm Apparatus have fallen year on year whilst rising again in 2009, but represent an increasing proportion of all incidents year on year (going up from 29% to 33% of all incidents).

Fire

Fig 3. Accidental Primary Fires between January 2006 and December 2009

Fig 4. Accidental Secondary Fires between January 2006 and December 2009

Fig 5. Fig 5. Deliberate Primary and Secondary Fires between January 2006 and December 2009

Special Service

## Fig 6. Special Service RTC incidents between January 2006 and December 2009

Fig. 7 Special Service (non RTC) between January 2006 and December 2009

Note: there was a steady reduction in the overall trend since 2007 (floods) and since 2006 the fall has been 9%.

Casualties and Fatalities Fire and Special Service

Fig 8. Casualties accidental and deliberate primary fires between January 2006 and December 2009


Fig 9. Casualties special services between January 2006 and December 2009

Note: The number of casualties has increased in 2009. This maybe due to a change in categorisation in the Incident Recording System (IRS). For example oxygen administration will now be classed as first aid and therefore be classified as an injury to a casualty. This could explain to a greater or lesser extent the increase in reported casualties.

Fig 10. Fatalities accidental and deliberate primary fires and special services January 2006 and December 2009


Fig 11. Detailed breakdown of fatalities by incident type 'Special Service

Other'

Fig 12. Detailed breakdown of fatalities by incident type 'Special Service – Person rescue/release'

Appendix Three

Hereford & Worcester Fire and Rescue Service
Service Management Board
Meeting date

Agenda Item No..   Proposed restructure of admin support within the Community Risk
Dept

Purpose of report

1.   This paper proposes a rationalisation and re-structure of administrative support within the Technical Fire Safety (TFS) and Community Safety (CS) Departments.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that SMB approve the following changes to the administrative support structure within the Community Safety and Technical Fire Safety Departments:

- Dis-establishment of the existing Grade 6 Senior Fire Safety Administrator Post

- Dis-establishment of the existing Grade 4 Home Fire Safety Administrator Post

- Dis –establishment of the existing Grade 3 TFS Administrator Post

- Establishment of Community Safety Senior Administrator- Grade 6

- Establishment of Technical Fire Safety Senior Administrator – Grade 6

- Establishment of Part – Time HFSC/Pinpoint Administer – Grade 3

Background

The existing job description for the Senior Fire Safety Administrator (as detailed in Appendix Three) was written in 2002. At that time the position was exclusively a TFS admin support role (referred to as Legislative FS) with the exception of line management responsibility for a CS Administrator. Since that time the CS Department has evolved considerably and has been subject to changes in structure, delivery and establishment. During this time the corresponding administrative workload and line management responsibilities have been integrated into the Senior Fire Safety Administrator role which has resulted in a significant change to the job profile and level of responsibility. In order to compensate the post holder for the increase in workload and personal responsibility the post was temporarily re-graded from Grade 6 (£23,708) to SO2 (£28,636). This situation, whilst effective at the time, has left the Service vulnerable with regard to robust succession planning and realistic job sizing.

As a result of the current IRMP reviews of the CS and TFS Departments, as well as the recent resignation of the Senior Fire Safety Administrator post-holder, an opportunity has arisen to review this situation and, in particular, to review and revise the structure of both department's admin support teams.

In conducting this review it must be recognised that a more robust and efficient management of the CFRMIS database is now critical to core TFS business in order to ensure that accurate, timely, high quality data is collated to a standard that satisfies internal and external specifications. The quality of data on the CFRMIS system has a direct effect on delivery of Community Risk Corporate Objectives, and management of supporting performance Indicators and therefore it needs to be of the highest possible standard. Details of the specific elements of CFRMIS management that are not currently being effectively managed can be found in Appendix Three.

It should also be acknowledged that the IRMP review of the CS Department has identified the need for a more evidence led approach to CS work, as well as greater data production, analysis and sharing with partner agencies. In order to support this approach the Service has recently invested in Pinpoint software which will be crucial in informing and directing all CS activity in future. Future responsibility for day to day administration of this software will sit with the CS Department administration team which will, in turn, require greater levels of expertise in data management than currently exists.

Whilst the two departments do have very different requirements and levels of specialist expertise with different software and databases there are some areas where generic skills are mirrored and can be shared and developed, therefore offering an opportunity to increase business continuity arrangements and robust fall-back arrangements.

The generic elements of the Senior Fire Safety Administrator's role are detailed in Appendix Three.

Conclusion / Summary

There is a need to ensure that both the Community Safety and Technical Fire Safety elements of the Senior Fire Safety Administrator function are effectively discharged both now and in the future. The current role is beyond the capacity and capability of a single individual.

In order to meet the existing and future requirements of both departments it is proposed that the current structure be modified to include two Grade 6 Administrators and two Grade 3 Administrators.

This proposal would result in one Grade 6 post in each department and two Grade 3 posts in the CS Department with an overall loss of one Grade 6 and one Grade 4 post from the CS Department and one Grade 3 post from the TFS Department. Such an arrangement would result in an overall saving of **£3,833** (Appendix Five) and would provide the correct grading commensurate with responsibility to meet the existing and perceived requirements of each department going forward.

There would be capacity issues to address by assimilating two roles into one in both the TFS role and CS role. However, the respective Heads of Department are confident that the wider IRMP Departmental reviews will resolve these issues.

Individuals have been identified who currently have the appropriate skills profile to support the proposed appointments and as a vacancy already exists there may be no requirement for compulsory redundancy.

An additional benefit from implementing such a proposal would be the provision of two unique, but complimentary posts under the same Department, which offers a new level of resilience not currently in place should one post become vacant. This would ensure that the challenges currently being experienced through the on-going vacancy would not reoccur in the future.

An early outcome of the IRMP Reviews currently underway within the TFS and CS Departments is the proposed re-structure of the administrative support function supporting both departments. Early implementation of these proposals will greatly assist both departments evolve and prepare for the future demands of the Service whilst at the same time realising essential efficiency savings.

Corporate Considerations

2.   An Impact Summary sheet is attached at Appendix One to identify and address the potential impact of the proposals contained in this report.

Supporting Information

Appendix 1 – Impact Summary Sheet

Appendix 2 – Current Senior Fire Safety Administrator Job Description and Person Specification
 Appendix 3 – Current minimum requirement for Technical Fire Safety Admin support / Supervision at SHQ

Appendix 4 – The generic elements of Senior Fire Safety Administrator role

Appendix 5 – Financial Savings Delivered

Background papers – n/a

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Appendix Four

Appendix Five

An organisational chart showing the Community Safety structure:

GC B Community Safety → SC B Community Safety, which branches into three areas:

WCB Arson Reduction/YFA
- Fire Setter Advisors
- Road Safety Officer
  - Education Assistant
  - Education Assistant

Senior CS Administrator
- CS Administrator
- CS Admin (Half Post)
- HFSC Technician
- HFSC Technician

WCB Community Safety Accidental Dwelling Fires
- Vulnerable Persons Officer
- CSA North
  - Volunteers
- CSA South
  - Volunteers
- CSA West
  - Volunteers